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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2013, the African Union (“AU”) requested the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to defer its prosecution of
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta for crimes against humanity
committed in his country. 1 The AU purported that any sitting African
head of state should be entitled to immunity, and Kenya threatened to
1. African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS
AFRICA (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24506006.
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withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ICC if the court did not answer
AU’s request. 2
Kenya’s request rekindled the debate over whether heads of state
have immunity for criminal conduct. The International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) answered this question in the Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 3 case (“Arrest Warrant”), where it held that the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s incumbent Minister of Foreign
Affairs had immunity from criminal prosecution. 4 The ICJ may not
have expected that its holding would open the floodgates to claims
for immunity, especially since the court opined that head of state
immunity would be unavailable in certain situations. 5 Nevertheless,
this decision has had serious implications on the ability of victims of
human rights violations to seek justice.
The ICJ overvalued the immunity doctrine by unjustifiably
expanding it to ministers of foreign affairs. It also failed to fully
appreciate the ability of international courts to remove head of state
immunity. The adventurousness and optimism of the court are not
consistent with fundamental international law principles, and
subsequent international and domestic jurisprudence have challenged
the Arrest Warrant’s credibility and called for the abrogation of the
head of state immunity doctrine. 6
This article argues that international and domestic courts should
not recognize head of state immunity for jus cogens crimes. Section
II outlines the various immunity categories, namely state immunity,
functional immunity, and personal immunity. It also discusses the
correlations between these doctrines and addresses the possibility of
invoking a jus cogens exception to immunity. Section III evaluates
the reasoning of the Arrest Warrant case and the dictum relating to
the circumstances under which head of state immunity is not
2. Id.
3. 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
4. Id. at 30, ¶ 71.
5. See id., at 25, ¶ 61 (highlighting four situations in which head of state
criminal immunity under international law would not apply: (1) in domestic courts
within the head of state’s own country; (2) when the State chooses to waive
immunity for the head of state’s actions; (3) when the former head of state is no
longer an incumbent; and (4) when certain international criminal courts have
jurisdiction over the incumbent head of state).
6. See infra Section III (detailing subsequent case law that criticizes the ICJ’s
approach in Arrest Warrant).
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applicable. It alleges that the ICJ misconceived the law when
engaging in this analysis in three ways.
First, the court lacked a basis to extend head of state immunity to
ministers of foreign affairs because it erroneously equated the
functions of heads of state with those of ministers of foreign affairs
without due regard to customary international law. It also failed to
recognize that any immunity domestic courts have granted to
ministers of foreign affairs has been based on comity rather than a
positive obligation.
Second, the international and domestic jurisprudence after Arrest
Warrant suggests that head of state immunity doctrine has eroded.
Moreover, the modern meaning of “sovereignty” has redefined a
head of state’s functions, shifting it toward a duty to safeguard the
interests of the State’s citizens. Under this framework, officials who
inflicted harm to their citizens, and thereby failed to effectively
perform their functions, cannot benefit from immunity. 7
Furthermore, in recognizing head of state immunity for jus cogens
crimes, States are in violation of article 41(2) of the International
Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility”), which prohibits States from recognizing serious
breaches of peremptory norms as lawful acts. 8
Finally, in affirming head of state immunity, the ICJ undermines
the efficacy of prosecuting individuals for serious violations of
international criminal law. While international criminal courts, such
as the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), and the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), do not recognize head of state immunity,

7. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. at 85, ¶¶ 74-75 (joint
separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) (highlighting the
need to balance ending impunity with independent state sovereignty).
8. See Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-Third Session, 56
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 286, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001]
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 29 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (pt. 2)
[hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility] (“No State shall recognize
as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40 [a
serious breach of a peremptory norm], nor render aid or assistance in maintaining
that situation.”).

494

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[30:3

heads of state may still invoke this immunity for offences over which
the courts above lack jurisdiction, such as when the offences were
committed beyond the territorial jurisdiction limits of the courts.
Heads of state that fall outside of this jurisdiction are able to escape
with impunity. Only a blanket rejection of head of state immunity
can prevent this.
Section IV analyzes whether Arrest Warrant constitutes good
precedent in terms of ensuring that the two fundamental pillars of
law, legal certainty and serving justice, are met. It concludes that
Arrest Warrant undermines both. This article suggests that an
international instrument that specifically governs head of state
immunity is necessary. Alternatively, local courts should be allowed
to prosecute heads of state for heinous crimes because it serves as an
easy avenue to achieve immediate criminal justice.

II. CATEGORIES OF IMMUNITY
There are three types of immunities: state immunity, functional
immunity, and personal immunity. Although the situations in which
these immunities apply vary, they are all related to the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium. This means “the courts of one country
may not assume jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign [s]tate without
its consent.” 9

A. STATE IMMUNITY
State immunity protects States from adjudication in foreign
domestic courts to allow the State and its representatives to perform
their public functions without judicial interference 10 Chief Justice
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court first propounded the concept by
describing state immunity as “[o]ne sovereign being in no respect
amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest
character not to degrade the dignity of his nation.” 11
State immunity has arguably progressed from an absolute to a
restrictive principle that allows domestic courts to assert jurisdiction
9. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 437 (2011).
10. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 487 (8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES].
11. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812).
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in certain circumstances. 12 A State’s conduct will be subject to
immunity only when “the [S]tate has acted in its official capacity as
sovereign political entity” (acta jure imperii), as opposed to acting in
a private or commercial nature (acta jure gestionis). 13 A plethora of
international instruments and domestic legislation have accepted this
restrictive approach. 14
12. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, INTERNATIONAL AND HOW
WE USE IT 79 (1994).
13. ELEANOR ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL
COURTS 301 (1933).
14. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec.
16, 2004) (limiting the availability of immunity within foreign jurisdictions in
regards to commercial transactions); European Convention on State Immunity arts.
6-7, May 16, 1972, 1495 U.N.T.S. 182 (providing limits on the immunities
available to States that conduct business within the territory of other States);
International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships art. 2, May 10,
1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 193 (providing liability for ships flagged in another State
within a second State’s domestic courts); 1926 International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Ships and
1934 Additional Protocol art. 3, Apr. 10, 1926, 179 L.N.T.S. 199 (providing
limited immunity for suits pertaining to ships); INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L,
TABLEAU GÉNÉRAL DES TRAVAUX (1873-1913) 150-53 (James Brown Scott ed.,
1920) (Fr.); U.N. Secretariat, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction: Memorandum by the Secretariat-General, ¶¶ 34-35, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Memorandum on State Officials’
Immunity]; Report of the International Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of Its Forty-Third Session, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 17, U.N. Doc.
A/46/10 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 33 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (pt.2) (limiting immunity from jurisdiction in cases of
commercial transactions); Institut de Droit Int’l, Resolution on the Immunity from
Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in Case of
International Crimes, art. 3, Napoli Session Res. (2009), available at
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf (removing
personal immunity from individuals when they are no longer acting on behalf of
the State). Many States have incorporated restrictive immunity into their domestic
laws. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012);
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) s 11 (Austl.); State Immunity Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 (Can.); State Immunity Ordinance, 1981, 20 U.N. Legislative
Series 20 (2003) (Pak.); State Immunity Act 1987, c. 313, § 5 (Sing.); Foreign
States Immunities Act 87 of 1981 § 4 (S. Afr.); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, §
3 (U.K.). Other States recognize restrictive immunity in their jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Manauta v. Embassy of Russian Fed’n, 113 I.L.R. 429, 430 (CSJIN 1994)
(Arg.) (analyzing both legislative texts and court documents and determining that
the restrictive theory of state immunity is now widely accepted); Gov’t of Can. v.
Emp’t App. Trib.& Burke, 95 I.L.R. 467, 472 (H. Ct. Ir. 1991) (adopting the
observations of Lord Wilberforce in Congreso del Partido, 64 I.L.R. 307, 318
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States retain immunity from criminal prosecution. As a result, in
the absence of any relevant rules under international law, courts
cannot criminalize States for their conduct. 15 State crimes were
purposefully excluded from the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. 16 Similarly, neither the Rome Statute for the ICC nor
the Nuremberg Charter recognizes that States are capable of
committing crimes. 17 In Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 18 the ICJ held
that a State could only incur obligations and responsibilities under
international law for non-criminal conduct. The ICJ reaffirmed a
State’s immunity from criminal prosecution in Jurisdictional

(1981) (U.K.) that courts should decide whether the relevant acts are “fairly within
an area of activity, trading or commercial, or otherwise of a private law character”
or whether they are “outside that area, and within the sphere of governmental or
sovereign activity.”); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jul. 21, 2006, 2003 (Ju) 1231, 60
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 (Japan) (holding that foreign
states are not immune to Japan’s jurisdiction in civil cases unless that jurisdiction
is likely to infringe on that State’s sovereignty); Ministry of Def. Gov’t of the U.K.
v. Ndegwa, 103 I.L.R. 235, 235 (C.A.K. 1983) (Kenya) (finding no absolute
sovereign immunity exists and the test is whether the government was acting in a
governmental or a private capacity); Marine Steel Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Marsh. Is.,
64 I.L.R. 539, 539 (HC N.Z. 1981) (finding that restrictive immunity applies to
actions both in rem and in personam); Barker McCormac (Pvt) Ltd. v. Gov’t
Kenya, 84 I.L.R. 18, 18 (S.C. Zim. 1981) (“The modern doctrine of restrictive
sovereign immunity . . . ha[s] superseded the traditional doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity as the prevailing norm of international law and the doctrine
should be incorporated into municipal law.”). Although Russia and China, for
instance, favor the absolute approach, commentators argue that, “[f]rom the
practice of the courts it can no longer be deduced . . . that the granting of
unrestricted immunity can still today be regarded as a usage followed by the great
majority of States in the belief that it is legally obligatory.” Pierre-Hugues Verdier
& Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International
Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 405 (2014) (suggesting that
these countries have held out against adopting restrictive immunity because they
are “large countries with extensive state involvement in their economies,
suggesting a high threshold that led them to adhere to absolute immunity while
most other states switched); see Claim Against the Empire of Iran, 45 I.L.R. 57
(BVerfG 1963) (Ger.).
15. Nigel White & Ademola Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 532 (Malcolm Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010).
16. See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, at 279, 281.
17. DAVID HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (7th
ed. 2010).
18. 2007 I.C.J. 140, ¶ 170 (Feb. 26).
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Immunities of the State. 19 At the same time, the ICJ distinguished it
and ruled that the removal of immunity for jus cogens crimes in
Pinochet should not apply to the present case because Pinochet
concerns a criminal proceeding against an individual, while the
present case was a civil case against a State itself. 20
As mentioned above, the rationale for state immunity originates
from the idea of par in parem non habet imperium. The
independence and equality of States are inviolable in the sense that
no State may assert jurisdiction over another. 21 The ICJ reiterated
sovereignty’s supremacy in the Corfu Channel Case, 22 finding that
sovereignty refers to “the whole body of rights and attributes which a
State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States,
and also in its relations with other States.” 23 In other words, States
may not exercise their sovereign powers within the territory of
another State. States must also “refrain from interfering in the
exercise of another State’s powers that qualify as exclusive under
international law.” 24 Accordingly, no foreign domestic court can
subject a State to judicial scrutiny without a waiver of state
immunity.
Requiring an immunity waiver is analogous to requiring States’
consent to accede jurisdiction to an international court. 25 Jennings
19. 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 91 (Feb. 3) (reaffirming the distinction between access to
immunity in civil and criminal cases).
20. Id. at 142, ¶ 97. The court refused to follow Pinochet, which had denied
head of state immunity for acts of torture, because the case only addressed the
applicability of immunity in a criminal proceeding against an individual, while the
ICJ was dealing with a civil case against a State. Id. at 138, ¶ 87.
21. See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 748 (2003)
(describing the historical origins of state sovereignty that viewed all States as
inherently equal and therefore incapable of being subject to the jurisdiction of
another State).
22. 1949 I.C.J. 39 (Apr. 9).
23. Id. at 43 (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez).
24. ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 68
(Vaughan Lowe ed., 2008).
25. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 12-14, Jul. 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing that by becoming a
party to the Rome Statute, States automatically accept the court’s jurisdiction); see
also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“The states parties to the present
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stressed that immunity without waiver and state consent “are the
obverse and reverse of the same coin” in that sovereignty is the
historical basis and rationale for both concepts. 26 Crawford
emphasized that because States cannot be subject to legal
responsibility without their consent, granting state immunity is just
as, if not more important, in domestic courts as it is in international
fora. 27 The United Kingdom House of Lords supported this
proposition in Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 28 opining that
other States cannot judge the appropriateness of a state official’s act
“[a]ffected by virtue of his sovereign authority abroad” rather than
personal act conducted as a British subject. 29 The United States
Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez 30 further commented that
relevant States must resolve any “grievances” that arise from the
official acts through diplomatic means. 31 These observations reflect
the belief that in claiming competence over official foreign sovereign
acts, domestic courts undermine the equality and independence of
States.

B. FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY
Functional immunity, or immunity rationae materiae, applies
when the impugned acts are conducted under the authority of a
sovereign, independent of whether the individuals are in office. This
immunity applies erga omnes when the official is operating overseas,
meaning that all States must respect his or her functional immunity,
not only the official’s State and the State in which he or she is
operating. 32 Both incumbent and former state officials are entitled to
claim functional immunity, irrespective of their place in the state

Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court”).
26. ROBERT JENNINGS, THE PLACE OF JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW 4 (1987).
27. See James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 820, 856-57 (1981) (citing civil jurisdiction in
transactional disputes as one such area).
28. (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 993, 999 (H.L.) (U.K.).
29. Id.
30. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
31. Id. at 252.
32. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 114-15.
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hierarchy. 33 Several international and domestic courts have allowed
such claims in criminal cases. 34 A wide variety of state officials,
including low-ranking ones, have also benefited from functional
immunity in civil cases. 35
Functional immunity originates from the ideology of state
immunity. Kelsen highlighted this interaction observing that only
acts that “human beings in their capacity as organs of the State”
perform manifest the legal existence of a State. 36 He further argued
that only when “the civil or criminal delict for which the individual is
prosecuted has the character of an act of State” should a court grant
immunity to that individual. 37 Because of the relationship between
functional and state immunity, official acts conducted under state
authority are attributed to the State. The officials bear no personal
responsibility for such conduct. If the State as a legal entity can
claim immunity under the same circumstances, the State’s official is
able to do the same. 38 The Appeals Chamber at the International
33. Paola Gaeta, Official Capacity and Immunities, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 975, 975 (Antonio
Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Gaeta, Official Capacity and Immunities].
34. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet (No. 3), 119 I.L.R. 112, 161-62 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.) (noting such
immunity is extended to heads of state in civil and criminal matters for acts
performed while in office); Bundesgericht [Bger] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec.
22, 2005 (Switz.); Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 177, 236-37, ¶ 170 (Jun. 4) (outlining the precedent
behind head of state immunity); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR,
Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of
Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶¶ 38, 41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997) (citing Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 I.L.R. 499,
500-01 (Fr.-N.Z. Arb. Trib. 1990), and Att’y Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R.
277, 308-09 (HCJ 1962) (Isr.)).
35. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Miller (1993), 95 I.L.R. 446, 460 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Can.)
(finding that functional immunity was preserved even though the nature of the
illegal acts was egregious and outside the scope of employment); Church of
Scientology Case, 65 I.L.R. 193, 193 (BHG 1978) (F.R.G) (finding police officers
covered by functional immunity in a civil case); R v. Jones, [2006] U.K.H.L. 26
(U.K.) (discussing that only a state cannot commit aggression and not an
individual).
36. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 358 (2d ed. 1966); see
also Propend Finance Pty. Ltd. v. Sing, [1997] A.C. 611 at 669 (Eng.) (noting that
the protections that immunities afford to states would be undermined if those
representing the state could be sued in their individual capacity).
37. KELSEN, supra note 36, at TBD; see Sing, [1997] A.C. at 669.
38. See Zachary Douglas, State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials, 82
THE
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) implicitly
recognized the “non-personal responsibility for official acts” in
Prosecutor v. Blaškić. 39 In this case, Croatia contested the
compulsory orders that the Trial Chamber issued against several
Croatian state officers to produce certain documents. The Appeals
Chamber held that the officers were acting in an official capacity and
as such enjoyed functional immunity because they were “mere
instruments of a State[,] and their official action [could] only be
attributed to the State.” 40
The concepts of functional immunity and state responsibility are
closely connected. State responsibility arises when the claim for
functional immunity succeeds. Accordingly, the criteria for imposing
state responsibility may also determine whether an act is “official.” 41
For an act to be attributable to the State, the ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility rely on the individual’s “apparent authority”
rather than on his or her motives for committing the act. 42 Courts
presume that this authority exists on the basis that States are at
liberty to “determine [their] internal structure” and “designate the
individuals acting as [s]tate agents or organs” pursuant to the
instructions issued to these individuals. 43 Courts must respect this. 44
The Italian Court explained that “the principle of international law of
respect for the internal legal organization of every State by all other
States . . . and thus not to attach civil or criminal consequences of a
personal character to the activities of these functionaries [of foreign
states],” provided that they acted within their functions. 45 The
mandate and directions that a State gives to its officials determine the
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 281, 282 (2012) (discussing the relationship between the
foreign state and the acts of the foreign official for determining immunity from
proceedings).
39. Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶¶ 39, 41
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
40. Id. ¶ 38.
41. See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, at 43
(presenting the text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful acts).
42. Id. at 102.
43. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, ¶ 41.
44. GAETANO MORELLI, DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE 201
(2nd ed. 1954).
45. Trib., 20 novembre 1953, 38 Riv. di Dir. Int. 79 (Roma) (1953) (It.).

2015]

LET THE RESPONSIBLE BE RESPONSIBLE

501

official nature of an official’s act. However, court investigations into
that mandate would require the court to assert jurisdiction over the
foreign state and hence undermine the exclusive competence of that
State. 46 A State has the exclusive right to sanction, or provide other
remedies against, its organs for not complying with the mandate the
State has authorized. 47 It follows that because a State retains
exclusive power over the conduct of its officials, it has the right to
request that States attribute official acts the State to protect its
officials or organs from accountability. 48
Although the “presumed apparent authority” test has received
general support, 49 proponents for a “personal motives” requirement
still exist. The Institut de Droit International, for example,
recognized that acts “performed exclusively to satisfy a personal
interest” prevent a former official from claiming functional
immunity. 50 Similarly, Robertson argued that actions taken in pursuit
of private gratification do not justify a claim for functional
immunity. 51 Lord Hope also made similar arguments in Regina v.
Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)
(“Pinochet”). 52

46. See Herbage v. Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C. 1990) (“The FSIA
bars . . . allegations [that] would require an adjudication of the proprietary and
legality of the acts of [another state] in the performance of [its] official duties.”).
47. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, ¶ 41.
48. Id. ¶ 43.
49. See Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of
States, Heads of Governments, and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS
21, 82 (1994) (noting that this application of international law is not always
appropriate, particularly in the context of international crimes).
50. Institut de Droit Int’l, Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of
Heads of State and of Government in International Law, art. 13(2), Vancouver
Session 2001 Res. (Aug. 26, 2001), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/
resolutionsE/2001_van_02_en.PDF [hereinafter Immunities from Jurisdiction
Resolution].
51. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 402 (4th ed. 2012).
52. 119 I.L.R. 135, 195 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.) (“The principle of immunity
ratione materiae protects all acts which the head of state has performed in the
exercise of the functions of government . . . There are only two exceptions to this
approach which customary international has recognized. The first relates to
criminal acts which the head of state did under the colour of his authority as head
of state but which were in reality for his own pleasure or benefit.”).
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Whether state officials who perform ultra vires acts retain their
functional immunity varies. U.S. courts, for instance, have rejected
immunity claims for official acts that contravened national laws. 53
On the other hand, the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
took a broader approach and considered the lawfulness of the act was
irrelevant, emphasizing that the State is responsible for all official
acts of its agents. 54 Other domestic and international courts have
agreed and added that ultra vires acts are attributable to the State
even if they are malicious in nature or do not fall within the authority
of a State recognized under international law. 55 Despite these varying
interpretations, the international community agrees that officials
performing acts that violate domestic legislation cannot rely on
functional immunity if the acts are “simultaneously prescribed by a
norm of international law that is directed to the conduct of
individuals.” 56 Section IV further explores whether jus cogens crimes
that state officials commit constitute ultra vires acts. 57

C. PERSONAL IMMUNITY
Personal immunity, or immunity rationae personae, “attaches to
the person” and applies to all acts, whether conducted in an official
capacity or not. 58 Historically, courts have limited the immunity to
53. See, e.g., Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1286 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(holding that when an official exceeds his or her authority, he or she can no longer
enjoy immunity for those actions); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175 (D.
Mass. 1995) (“[A]n individual official of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity
under FSIA in an action brought against him for acts beyond the scope of his
authority”).
54. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, at 103.
55. See Jaffe v. Miller (1993), 95 I.L.R. 446, 460 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Can.)
(emphasizing that malicious and egregious acts are outside the scope of
immunity’s intent); see also A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 883
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that, although former heads of state do not retain immunity
for violations of jus cogens, States may retain such immunity because of particular
protections under their recognized sovereignty); Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82
I.L.R. 499, 500-01 (Fr.-N.Z. Arb. Trib. 1990) (finding the French government
liable when French agents sabotaged a Greenpeace boat and killed a person
onboard).
56. Douglas, supra note 38, at 323.
57. See infra Section IV (discussing the exceptions to functional immunity that
occur when a state actor breaches a jus cogens).
58. Rahmat Mohamad, The Role of the International Criminal Court and the
Rome Statute in International Criminal Justice Standard Setting: Some Reflections,
in SHIFTING GLOBAL POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND
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diplomats and heads of state. 59 This article will only focus on
analyzing heads of state.
Head of state immunity allows heads of state to enjoy absolute
immunity “from all measures of constraint and any exercise of
jurisdiction on the part of a foreign [s]tate for [criminal] acts
committed by them, anywhere in the world, in the exercise of their
official functions,” including private acts. 60 This applies erga omnes.
The situation is different, however, in the context of foreign civil
proceedings. After the mid-twentieth century, domestic courts trying
civil cases departed from the absolute immunity ideology. 61 The
Institut de Droit International also suggested a more restrictive
approach where head of state immunity applied only when the head
of state was exercising his official functions in committing the act. 62
Head of state immunity applies to incumbent, but not former, heads
of state, although the latter may still claim functional immunity, if
available. Heads of state are the main beneficiaries of head of state
immunity. Family members, and spouses in particular, 63 may also
OPPORTUNITIES 100, 108 (Rowena Maguire et al. eds., 2013).
59. Id.
60. Marcos v. Fed. Dep’t of Police, 102 I.L.R. 198, 202 (TF 1989) (Switz.);
see Re Honecker, 80 I.L.R. 365, 365-66 (BHG 1984) (F.R.G.) (upholding head of
state immunity and finding that this “immunity was based on the mutual interests
of States in enjoying undisturbed bilateral relations”); Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 20-21, ¶ 51 (Feb. 14)
(emphasizing that heads of state, heads of government, and ministers of foreign
affairs enjoy immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction).
61. See, e.g., Mobutu v. SA Cotoni, 91 I.L.R. 259, 260 (Civ. Ct. Brussels
1988) (Belg.) (finding that head of state immunity does not extend to family
members of the head of state); Prince of X Road Accident Case, 65 I.L.R. 13, 14
(OGH 1964) (Austria) (distinguishing between the immunity of foreign states and
foreign heads of state); Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior S.A.R.L., 24
I.L.R. 228, 228 (CA Paris 1957) (Fr.) (holding that, although the King made a
purchase while in office, he was still bound to deliver the purchase price because
his immunity did not extend to this area).
62. Immunities from Jurisdiction Resolution, supra note 50, art. 3.
63. Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (Austl.) s 36 (instructing that the
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act of 1967 applies to the spouse of the
head of a foreign state); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 20 (U.K.) (instructing
that the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 applies to members of a head of state’s
family that form part of his household); Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546
N.Y.S.2D 506 (App. Div. 1989); Estate of Silme G. Domingo v. Marcos, No. C821055V, 1983 WL 482332, at *3 (W.D.Wash. July 14, 1983) (recognizing that the
consular agreement between Poland and the United States extended to consular
officials’ family members).
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benefit from the rule, but only in domestic criminal cases. 64 The
ability of heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs to
claim head of state immunity is more obscure. The ICJ “clarified”
this issue in Arrest Warrant. However, as Section III addresses in
greater detail, many commentators and courts have criticized this
decision, arguing that heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs
are symbolically distinct. 65
One of the rationales for granting head of state immunity is to
facilitate the head of state’s exercise of its functions. A similar
purpose underlies the immunity of diplomatic agents. 66 However,
this argument lacks credibility because heads of state are generally
entitled to claim immunity from domestic criminal jurisdiction
regardless of the nature of the acts concerned, including in
circumstances where the State does not discharge the functions of the
head of state.
An alternate justification relies on the superlative status of heads
of state. While the “mystique of sovereignty” has somewhat faded,
heads of state are still viewed “as the supreme representatives of, and
in some respects the personal manifestations of, their States.” 67 The
head of state immunity and par in parem non habet imperium
principles are therefore intertwined. 68 The Swiss Federal Tribunal
recognized this relationship in Marcos v. Fed. Dep’t of Police, 69
finding that the representative character of heads of state in interstate
relations is the symbolic embodiment of sovereignty and serves as
the foundation for privileges rationae personae granted under
customary international law. 70

64. See Marcos v. Fed. Dep’t of Police, 102 I.L.R. 198, 201 (TF 1989) (Switz.)
(explaining that this protection has always been available to family members of
heads of state under customary international law); see also Mobutu, 91 I.L.R. at
260-61 (refusing to grant immunity to the family members of the Zairian President
Mobutu in a civil case).
65. See infra Part II (analyzing the Arrest Warrant case in detail).
66. Psinakis v. Marcos, 81 I.L.R. 605, 605 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
67. Watts, supra note 49, at 36.
68. ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
355-63 (9th ed. 1992).
69. 102 I.L.R. 198 (TF 1989) (Switz.).
70. See id. at 200 (“[S]uch personal immunity is the counterpart of the
immunity enjoyed by a foreign [s]tate acting jure imperii, that is to say in the
exercise of its sovereign powers.”).
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As the ultimate authority within the State, heads of state have the
right to waive their own immunity. 71 Unsurprisingly, no head of state
has rendered such a waiver. 72 To give meaning to this mechanism,
some scholars have proposed that the decision to waive immunity
attached to a head of state should fall upon his affiliated government
as a whole. 73

D. VARYING APPLICATIONS OF THE IMMUNITY CATEGORIES
BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Some commentators have noted the relationship between state
immunity and functional or head of state immunity. For instance, one
commentator recognized that state immunity derived from earlier
conceptions of head of state immunity. 74 Similarly, when
determining that the customary international law rules must be
codified, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) commented that
state immunity should encompass the immunity of heads of state,
“men-of-war[,] and of the armed forces of the State.” 75 Despite these
observations, head of state or functional immunity and state
immunity apply in different circumstances. In Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State, 76 the ICJ found Pinochet was irrelevant to
the case at hand because it dealt with head of state immunity from
71. PHILIPPE CAHIER, LE DROIT DIPLOMATIQUE CONTEMPORAIN
[CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMATIC LAW] 342 (1962).
72. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet (No. 3), 119 I.L.R. 112, 114 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.) (discussing former head
of state Pinochet’s claim of immunity for past crimes against humanity);
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-AR72(E), Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (noting that
Charles Taylor did not waive his immunity as the former President of the Republic
of Liberia); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on
Preliminary Motions, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8,
2001) (noting that the accused tried to raise his immunity as a former head of state
in the proceedings).
73. See VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 24, at 181-82 (noting that heads of state
should not be able to waive immunity against the government’s wishes).
74. See Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments,
167 RECUEIL DES COURS 121, 121 (1980) (noting that state immunity is grounded
in historical principles of individual sovereign immunity).
75. INT’L L. COMM’N, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO THE
WORK OF CODIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, at ¶ 54, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 1948.V.1(1) (1949) [hereinafter U.N.
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
76. 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 87 (Feb. 3).
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criminal prosecution, whereas the ICJ was concerned with state
immunity from civil liability. 77
The ICJ’s decision illustrates that the nature of the proceedings,
whether civil or criminal, may have a bearing on the type of
immunity available. The House of Lords recognized this in Pinochet,
emphasizing the criminal nature of the proceeding to justify the
removal of functional immunity for torture. 78 The difference is that
criminal proceedings concern individuals, not States. The
punishment is “personalized” and “separat[e] from the state of
nationality of the perpetrator.” 79 In any event, States cannot be
criminally responsible under international law, particularly for
international crimes. 80
In contrast, not applying immunity for state officials in the civil
context would have implications for state immunity. In Jones v.
United Kingdom, 81 the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)
explained that, in civil cases, upholding the immunities of state
77. See id. (distinguishing this case from Regina v. Bow Street Metro
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), 119 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.)).
78. See Pinochet, 119 I.L.R. at 235 (“Why is it said to be contrary to
international law to prosecute someone who was once head of state, or a state
official, in respect of acts committed in his official capacity? It is common ground
that the basis of the immunity claimed is an obligation owed to Chile, not to
Senator Pinochet. The immunity asserted is Chile’s. Were these civil proceedings
in which damages were claimed in respect of acts committed by Senator Pinochet
in the government of Chile, Chile could argue that it was itself indirectly
impleaded. That argument does not run where the proceedings are criminal and
where the issue is Senator Pinochet’s personal responsibility, not that of Chile.”);
see also Jaffe v. Miller (1993), 95 I.L.R. 446, 460 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (arguing
that the particularly egregious nature of the illegal acts removed the foreign
dignitaries’ entitlement to immunity).
79. Philippa Webb, Human Rights and the Immunities of State Officials, in
HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 114, 134
(Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012).
80. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fiftieth Session, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 64-77, U.N. Doc. A/53/10
(1998), reprinted in [1998] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 77 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1998/Add.1 (pt. 2) (elucidating the disparate viewpoints on state
criminal responsibility and concluding that the Special Rapporteur’s assessment
that state criminal responsibility in the penal sense does not yet exist at
international law, although this may change in the future).
81. App. Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, para. 212 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 14, 2014),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-140005#
{“itemid”:[“001-140005”]}.
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officials implies that States are responsible for the acts. Removing
their immunities in civil cases would allow for an indirect route to
recovery against foreign states. On the other hand, state immunity
would bar claims brought directly against foreign states. 82 This may
justify the distinction(s) in civil and criminal proceedings. In
summary, the perpetrators would be protected, however, if three
circumstances were met: the case was a civil claim; “immunity
would [have] be[en] available had the claim instead been brought
directly against the State;” and they acted in their official capacity. 83
Several domestic courts have acknowledged functional immunity
exists in the civil context. 84
Some commentators argue that distinguishing between civil and
criminal proceedings is unnecessary because certain countries allow
victims to present their cases and seek damages in criminal
proceedings. 85 They contend that if the court maintains the civil/
criminal distinction, it only complicates matters, especially when the
judges wish to adjudicate both matters in one sitting. In Jones, the
ECtHR agreed and argued that any distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings with respect to immunity would affect the
degree to which civil compensation is available in mixed
proceedings. 86 Commentators further argue that even if functional
82. Webb, supra note 79, at 142.
83. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 24, at 149. But see id. (noting that, although
actions pursued in one’s official capacity carry immunity privileges, there are
instances in which a foreign dignitary may be acting outside his official capacity
and immunity would still attach).
84. See Fang v. Jiang [2007] NZAR 420, ¶¶ H4, 31-32, 69-71 (HC) (N.Z.)
(finding that no valid reason exists to distinguish Jones and this case and arguing
that it was improper for New Zealand’s domestic courts to unilaterally try to
establish international law precedent rather than allowing international law to
develop slowly over time); see also Habib v. Commonwealth [2010] FCAFC 12,
¶¶ 85, 112-15 (Austl.) (noting that civil actions against government officials are
actions against the State); R v. Jones, [2006] U.K.H.L. 26, ¶ 26 (U.K.) (noting that
it is not possible to find individual responsibility for the crime of aggression
without first determining whether the aggression was committed by a State).
85. See Webb, supra note 79, at 143 (noting that courts in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands, among others, allow victims to present their cases and seek damages
in criminal proceedings).
86. See Jones v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, para. 212
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-140005#{“itemid”:[“001-140005”]} (finding some support for
the contention that individuals may be held criminally liable for torture because
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immunity is lifted in civil proceedings, the injured party would not
be able to recover from the State because international law provides
that any damages awarded in civil proceedings can only be enforced
against the state official and not the State. 87 Nevertheless, if state
officials were not allowed to claim functional immunity, this would
inescapably diminish the State’s right to immunity. Despite these
arguments, the ECtHR has expressed that state practice relating to
the removal of immunity in civil proceedings is still in a state of
flux.88 The court opined that while a trend in favor of lifting
immunity for torture in civil cases has emerged, the view that
individuals cannot sue a State’s “servants or agents” to circumvent
the State’s immunity remains. 89 An exception to immunity in civil
cases might emerge if the jurisprudence continues to develop as the
ECtHR noted.

E. EXCEPTION TO FUNCTIONAL AND PERSONAL IMMUNITY FOR JUS
COGENS CRIMES
Removing functional or personal immunity for jus cogens crimes
remains a contentious issue. There are two separate justifications for
lifting functional immunity. First, the crimes that state organs
commit are not “official” because of the peremptory nature of the
crimes. Second, the mere peremptory “tag” on the crimes creates a
separate exception to functional immunity.
1. The “Disqualification” Rationale
The “disqualification” argument centers on a State’s function,
rather than the classification of the crimes as peremptory. Whenever
an “official” act concerns an international crime, the presumption
that heads of state act under ostensible authority is rebutted. The
Nuremberg Tribunal explained that “[c]rimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entitles, and only by
torture cannot be carried out in an official state capacity).
87. Webb, supra note 79, at 143 (acknowledging that while the State may
choose to pay the damages on the official’s behalf, it has no duty to do so); see
Saorstat v. Rafael De Las Morenas, 12 I.L.R. 97, 98 (S.C. 1994) (Ir.) (noting that
the Spanish government would defray costs that a Spanish officer incurred when
on official business in Ireland).
88. Jones, App. Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06, para. 213.
89. Id.
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punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced.” 90 This statement implies that
individuals cannot commit international crimes under state authority
because those acts do not fall within the ambit of a State’s functions.
Accordingly, these acts cannot be attributed to the State. 91 Notably,
the statutes of international criminal tribunals explicitly prohibit
perpetrators to rely on their official position as a defense. 92 In this
context, functional immunity ceases to operate before international
courts when crimes against international law are involved. 93
The peremptory nature of the crime presupposes that the acts are
not official. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”) emphasizes that peremptory norms are those that
the international community has accepted as non-derogable. 94 In
lifting the immunities that foreign state officials enjoy for some welldefined jus cogens crimes, state sovereignty is not undermined
because determining the scope of the official’s mandate is no longer
necessary. 95
While international criminal courts have explicitly rejected
90. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41
AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 221 (1947).
91. Cf. WILLIAM HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 268-69 (7th ed.
1917) (arguing that piracy cannot be committed under the authority of a State
because piratical acts are lawful acts of war under such circumstances).
92. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6, S.C. Res. 1315,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Rwanda art. 6, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
93. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L. Q. REV.
438, 442-43 (1947).
94. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion,
it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. . . . . [A]
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”).
95. See VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 24, at 241 (stating that “[f]unctional
immunity ends where individual responsibility begins” and that prosecuting
individuals for these crimes does not violate state sovereignty because crimes
against international law do not qualify as state acts”).
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functional immunity in their statutes, whether national courts adopt
similar approaches is less clear. 96 For instance, the ICJ in Arrest
Warrant concluded that customary international law, as reflected in
the practice of national courts, did not support removing functional
immunity for jus cogens crimes. 97 However, some domestic courts
have prosecuted foreign war criminals acting under the cloak of state
authority. In Att’y Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 98 the Israeli Supreme
Court held that crimes against humanity are “completely outside the
‘sovereign’ jurisdiction of the State.” 99 In Wijngaarde v. Bouterse, 100
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal stressed that the commission of
crimes against humanity and torture “cannot be regarded as part of
the official duties of a head of state.” 101 In Pinochet, Lord Hutton
refused to acknowledge that acts of torture could be deemed part of a
head of state’s official duties because “international law expressly
prohibits torture as a measure which a [S]tate could employ in any
circumstances whatsoever and ha[s] made it an international
crime.” 102

Case law is also inconsistent in civil proceedings. 103 In Hilao v.
96. Cf. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application
for Subpoenas, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 1, 2003)
(noting, without deciding, that national courts may choose to recognize the
functional immunity of state officials).
97. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 24 (Feb. 14).
98. 36 I.L.R. 277 (HCJ 1962) (Isr.).
99. Id. at 310.
100. Hof ‘s Amsterdam 20 november 200 (Wijngaarde & Hoost/Bouterse)
(Neth.), translated in 3 Y.B OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 677, 688 (2000) [(2001)
32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 266 (Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam) District Court of Amsterdam (sitting on appeal against a decision of
the office of the Public Prosecutor), interlocutory order of 3 March 2000 and order
of 20 November 2000 (District Court order), case note by F van Sliedregt and N
Keijzer in (2000) 3 Ybk Int’l Humanitarian L 548, English translation of the order
of 20 November published in ibid 677; see LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 173-78
(2003).
101. Id. at 113.
102. Regina v. Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No.
3), 119 I.L.R. 112, 165-66 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.).
103. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
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Marcos, 104 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (“FSIA”) confers foreign
official immunity for acts of torture and execution. 105 The court
remarked that the acts were not “within any official mandate” and
therefore did not constitute the acts of an “agency or instrumentality”
as defined under the FSIA. 106 In addition, the court opined that its
previous rejection that the conduct in question was a state act and
that equating the acts in dispute with sovereign’s public acts is
unmeritorious. 107 Other domestic courts have decided otherwise. In
Doe v. Liu Qi, 108 the District Court for the Northern District of
California rejected the fact that the Chinese officials’ acts became
non-official only because they engaged in international crimes
against Falun Gong practitioners. 109 In Matar v. Dichter, 110 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
fact that the former Director of Israel’s General Security Service
participated in jus cogens crimes, namely extrajudicial killings, did
not necessarily mean that the impugned acts fell outside the scope of
an official’s lawful authority under FSIA. 111
Although the “disqualification” argument may sound attractive,
perpetrators could eschew liability for crimes that require state
participation. High-ranking officials often commit jus cogens crimes,
such as genocide and torture, as a matter of state policy. These
crimes are then official by definition. 112 In Arrest Warrant, dissenting
the 9th Circuit rejected foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §
1605). But see Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act confers automatic immunity in
the absence of a statutory exception and, without more, a jus cogens violation does
not constitute an implied waiver); Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1280,
1285 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act trumps
the Alien Tort Claims Act).
104. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
105. See id. at 1472 (finding jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
106. Id. at 1472.
107. Id. at 1471.
108. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
109. See id. at 1280, 1285 (discussing how the defendants had not only
committed international crimes, but had acted outside of the scope of their
individual governmental positions).
110. 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
111. Id. at 292-93.
112. Jan Wouters, The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the
Arrest Warrant Case: Some Critical Remarks, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 253, 262
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Judge van den Wyngaert pinpointed that “[s]ome crimes under
international law . . . can, for practical purposes, only be committed
with the means and mechanisms of a State and as part of a [s]tate
policy. They cannot . . . be anything other than ‘official’ acts.” 113 In
consequence, the official would retain functional immunity for such
acts.
2. The Peremptory Norm Rationale
An alternative rationale for lifting functional immunity for jus
cogens crimes is that the peremptory “tag” on the crimes
automatically provides for an exception. This proposition focuses on
the peremptory nature of the crimes, irrespective of whether the
perpetuators committed the crimes in an official capacity. 114 Gaeta
articulated that high-ranking officials are not entitled to functional
immunity in criminal proceedings before national or international
courts when the crimes in question contravene international law. 115
She considered this customary principle to cover acts that state
organs perform in their official capacity. 116 The relationship between
the exception and the rule of functional immunity is one of lex
specialis versus lex generalis. 117
Some judges in Pinochet supported this exception. 118 Lord Millett
acknowledged that torture must be committed in an official capacity,
otherwise it would not meet the elements of the crime. 119 He
emphasized the dilemma and stressed that if the official were acting
(2003).
113. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 161, ¶ 36 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert).
114. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Judgment on the
Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II
of 18 July 1997, ¶ 41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997)
(noting the following exceptions to the invocation of immunity: perpetrators of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide and certain classes of persons such
as those acting as spies).
115. See Gaeta, Official Capacity and Immunities, supra note 33, at 975, 982-83
(citing to crimes against humanity and genocide specifically).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 983.
118. Regina v. Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No.
3), 119 I.L.R. 112, 138, (H.L. 1999) (Eng.) (Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hope,
Hutton, Saville, Millett, and Phillips).
119. Id. at 231.
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in a private capacity when conducting the torture, he could not be
charged with torture. He could be charged if he were acting in an
official capacity, but then he would enjoy immunity from
prosecution 120 In the latter case, it would be a fallacy to automatically
attach functional immunity to any “official” acts since
“[i]nternational law cannot be supposed to have established a crime
having the character of a jus cogens and at the same time to have
provided an immunity which is co-extensive with the obligation it
seeks to impose.” 121 Accordingly, Lord Millett prioritized the rules
establishing jus cogens crimes and introduced a separate exception to
functional immunity that would apply to crimes that require state
responsibility, such as torture and forced disappearance. 122 In Ferrini
v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 123 the Italian Court of Cessation affirmed
this position and held that the rules establishing jus cogens crimes
are of a higher rank and must prevail over the contradictory state
immunity rule. 124
The validity of the peremptory norm argument depends on
whether a conflict between the immunity rule and the rules
establishing jus cogens crimes exist. Proponents argue that if the
immunity doctrine contradicts a peremptory norm, it will become
void. 125 Various courts and judges are skeptical about this
proposition. In the context of state immunity and immunity from
civil jurisdiction, international courts unanimously observed that the
two rules operate on different levels, one on the procedural plane and
the other on the substantive plane. 126 In Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, 127 the ECtHR held that despite torture’s special preemptory
120. Id.
121. Id. at 232.
122. Id.; see Ferrini v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 128 I.L.R. 658, 669 (Cass. 2004)
(It.); Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
841, 841 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, International Criminal Law and Augusto
Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT’L. L. 829, 836-37 n.14 (2000).
123. 128 I.L.R. 658 (Cass. 2004) (It.).
124. Id. at 669.
125. Cf. VCLT, supra note 94, art. 53 (“A treaty is void of, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”).
126. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶¶ 93-94
(Feb. 3); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 103; Rainbow
Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 I.L.R. 499, 499 (Fr.-N.Z. Arb. Trib. 1990); HAZEL FOX,
THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 525 (2002).
127. 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
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character, international law has not accepted that prohibiting such
conduct prevails over state immunity for civil claims arising out of
torture. 128 In R v. Jones, 129 Lord Hoffman expressed that for a conflict
to arise, “an ancillary procedural rule” must exist that permits or
imposes jurisdiction on States for acts of torture. 130 He continued that
such development should be encouraged and might have already
taken place if the prohibition of torture included it. 131 A recent ICJ
decision, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, clarified that the rule
on state immunity and the peremptory prohibition on enslavement do
not conflict. 132 The court was aware that the Armed Activities in the
Congo and Arrest Warrant rulings articulated that a jus cogens rule
by itself is incapable of conferring jurisdiction or displacing the
immunities of the officials. 133 Fox concurred that “there is no
substantive content in the procedural plea of [s]tate immunity upon
which a jus cogens mandate can bite” and remarked that the
immunity rule only requires that a breach of a jus cogens norm must
be resolved through other means of settlement. 134 These remarks
suggest that a jus cogens exception does not exist with respect to
state and a fortiori, functional immunity from foreign civil
jurisdiction.
A different scenario, however, may arise in the criminal context.
Villalpando underscored that “the supreme condemnation of crimes
against humanity and the principle of universality” to combat the
crimes contradict the immunity defense. 135 Bianchi stressed that
immunity is illogical with respect to international crimes since
international law cannot simultaneously shield officials from
prosecution for their heinous acts and reprimand the acts as
128. Id. at 103.
129. [2006] U.K.H.L. 26, 730-49 (U.K.).
130. Id. at 732.
131. Id.
132. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. at 140-41.
133. Id. at 141, ¶ 95; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 32,
¶ 64 (Feb. 3); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3, 24, ¶ 58 (Feb. 14).
134. FOX, supra note 126, at 525.
135. Santiago Villalpando, L’affaire Pinochet: Beaucoup de Bruit Pour Rien?
L’Apport au Droit International de la Décision de la Chambre des Lords du 24
mars 1999, 104 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 418, 424
(2000) (Fr.).
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criminal. 136 Villalpando and Bianchi seemingly shifted the focus
from whether the immunity and jus cogens norms conflicted to
whether the international legal regime offered effective protection.
The goal of maximizing the effectiveness of the international legal
regime may have prompted courts worldwide to lift functional
immunity from criminal jurisdiction. In its commentary, the ILC
underlined that “[t]he absence of any procedural immunity with
respect to prosecution or punishment in appropriate proceedings is an
essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity or
defense.” 137 This applies both to international and domestic courts. 138
The official position of the perpetrator is neither relevant nor
conducive to effective humanitarian protection. The copious amount
of international and domestic jurisprudence and commentary that
have recognized this “irrelevance rule” is evidence that the concept
has attained customary status. 139 The fact that article 27 of the Rome
Statute lifts immunities rationae materiae for the offences further
reaffirm this. 140
For immunity rationae personae, the jus cogens exception does
not apply in criminal cases. In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ referred to
state practice and national legislation and examined a few domestic
136. Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 237, 260-61 (1999).
137. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on
the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 27, U.N.
Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (pt. 2).
138. Report by Mr. J. L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/41
(1951), reprinted in [1957] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1.
139. See, e.g., U.N. Memorandum on State Officials’ Immunity, supra note 14,
¶¶ 132-33 nn. 577-78 (identifying eight international documents, three
international cases, and eight domestic cases supporting this proposition); see also
Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 414 (2004); Antonio Cassese, When May Senior
State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on The Congo
v Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 864-66, 870-74 (2002); Salvatore
Zappalà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation,
12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 595, 601-02 (2001).
140. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 27 (“This Statute shall apply equally to
all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.”); see Gaeta, Official
Capacity and Immunities, supra note 33, at 990.
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cases, including Pinochet and Ass. SOS Attentats and Beatrix de
Boery v. France (“Gaddafi”), and concluded that an exception to the
personal immunity of incumbent high-ranking officials for war
crimes or crimes against humanity did not exist under customary
international law. 141
Domestic legislation purportedly affirms this position. Several
domestic statutes do not allow for an exception to immunity. 142
Interestingly, Belgium initially rejected any claim for immunity
based on official capacity, but it amended its statute in 2003 to
conform to the Arrest Warrant ruling. 143
In Gaddafi, the French Court of Cassation accorded immunity to
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the incumbent Libyan head of state, for
complicity in a terrorist act, rejecting the prosecution’s argument that
“no immunity could cover complicity in the destruction of property
as a result of an explosion causing death and involving a terrorist
undertaking.” 144 The Belgian Court of Cassation similarly reasoned
that under customary international law, heads of state and heads of
government should not be subject to criminal prosecution in a
foreign state without express contrary provisions providing for such
an exception. 145 The court disregarded the original 1993 Act, which
dealt with immunity, since it “contravene[d] the principle of
customary international criminal law on jurisdictional immunity.” 146
In three separate cases, the England Bow Street Magistrates’ Court
granted immunity to the incumbent President of Zimbabwe, the
Israeli Defense Minister, and the Chinese Minister of Commerce for
torture and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 147 The
141. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 24, ¶ 58 (Feb. 14).
142. Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) s 36 (Austl.); State Immunity
Act, 1978, c. 33, § 20 (U.K.).
143. Belgium’s Amendment to the Law of June 15, 1993 Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law 2003 art. 13,
Aug. 7, 2003, 42 I.L.M 1258 (2003).
144. Gaddafi, 125 I.L.R. 490, 509 (Cass. 2001) (Fr.).
145. H.S.A. v. S.A., 42 I.L.M. 596, 599-600 (Cass. 2003) (Belg.) (reasoning
that domestic law cannot be interpreted in a way that would disrupt the customary
international law regarding immunity).
146. Id. at 600.
147. Re Bo Xilai, 128 I.L.R. 713, 715 (Bow St. Magis. Ct. 2005) (U.K.); Re
Mofaz, 128 I.L.R. 709, 712 (Bow St. Magis. Ct. 2004) (U.K.); Tatchell v. Mugabe,
136 I.L.R. 572, 573 (Bow St. Magis. Ct. 2004) (U.K.).
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Spanish National Court similarly granted immunity to the Presidents
of Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and the King of Morocco for
international crimes. 148 All of these courts relied heavily on Arrest
Warrant in their decision-making process. 149

III. DISSECTING OF THE ARREST WARRANT CASE
In 1993, the Parliament of Belgium passed a law allowing the
Belgian courts to try people alleged to have committed war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide on the basis of universal
jurisdiction. In 2000, Belgium issued an arrest warrant, pursuant to
the law, against Yerodia, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Rwandan genocide. Arrest
Warrant dicta are just as, if not more, contentious than the ICJ’s
ruling extending head of state immunity to ministers of foreign
affairs. 150 The court enumerated four situations in which head of state
immunity would be lifted. First, when the high-ranking officials’
own courts try them in accordance with relevant domestic law.
Second, when the official’s state waives head of state immunity.
Third, when the foreign state prosecutes former officials for official
acts they committed before or after their official employment or for
their private acts committed while in office. 151 Finally, when
international criminal courts try both former and incumbent

148. S.A.N., Dec. 13, 2007 Castro (Reporter No. 4/3/1999 and 13/12/2007);
S.A.N., Mar. 4, 1999; see J. GONZÁLEZ VEGA, 1 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 811-16 (2001); S.A.N. Dec. 23, 1998 Obiang Nguema
(23/12/1998) (Central Examining Magistrate No. 5) (AN); Hassan II (23/12/1998)
(Central Examining Magistrate No 5) (Audencia Nacional) (Spain); Garzón
archival asacusaciones contra Hassan II y Obiang, EL MUNDO, (Dec. 24, 1998);
see also Angel Sánchez Legido, Spanish Practice in the Area of Universal
Jurisdiction, 8 SPANISH Y.B. INT’L L. 46 (2002); S.A.N., Feb. 6, 2008 (“Immunity
of President Paul Kagame”) Re Kagame, Audienca Nacional, Auto del Juzgado
Central de Instruction No 4 (2008) 151-57 Rwanda (6/2/2008) (Central Examining
Magistrate No 4); S.A.N., Dec. 23, 1998.
149. Gionata Piero Buzzini, Lights and Shadows of Immunities and Inviolability
of State Officials in International Law: Some Comments on the Djibouti v. France
Case, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 455, 461 (2009) (arguing that recent pronouncements
by the British courts have expanded the immunity protection afforded by
government officials).
150. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 25-26, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14).
151. Id.
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officials. 152 The subsections below will discuss how the ICJ
misconceived the law when formulating these exceptions in three
ways. First, the ICJ lacked a basis to extend head of state immunity
to a minister of foreign affairs. Second, international and domestic
jurisprudence suggests that the bases for support of head of state
immunity no longer reflect customary international law. Finally,
international criminal courts have refused to accept head of state
immunity as a defense, but because they are limited in jurisdiction,
they cannot completely lift head of state immunity. Without a
blanket rejection of head of state immunity, heads of state that fall
outside the jurisdiction of these international criminal courts escape
with impunity.

A. ABSENCE OF A BASIS FOR THE EXTENSION OF HEAD OF STATE
IMMUNITY TO MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The contentious issue is whether high-ranking officials, such as
heads of state, heads of government, and ministers of foreign affairs,
enjoy immunity from both civil and criminal jurisdiction in other
States. 153 The ICJ answered this question in the affirmative, despite
finding that international instruments, such as the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations and the New York Convention on Special
Missions (“New York Convention”), do not govern the issue. 154 The
ICJ discussed that ministers of foreign affairs are representative of
their States in international negotiations, are responsible for the
government’s diplomatic activities, and are frequently required to
travel abroad. It accentuated that ministers of foreign affairs need full
immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability to effectively
facilitate performing these official functions, rather than safeguard
their personal benefit. 155
Throughout its analysis, the ICJ disregarded state practice on
granting immunity to ministers of foreign affairs. Judge van den
Wyngaert summarized the crux of the argument in her dissenting
opinion. She noted that the court should have done more than
analyze the rationale for granting immunity to foreign ministers to

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 21, 23, ¶¶ 52-53.
Id. at 21, ¶ 52.
Id. at 21-22, ¶¶ 53-54.
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determine whether immunity existed under customary international
law. Van den Wyngaert criticized the court for failing to assess
whether state practice and opinio juris supported granting immunity
to ministers of foreign affairs. 156
As van den Wyngaert expressed, to determine whether ministers
of foreign affairs enjoy immunity under customary international law,
courts must examine whether state practice and opinio juris
supporting immunity exist. In the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, 157 the ICJ elaborated on the features of these two elements.
The court noted that “[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such
a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.” 158
Accordingly, any head of state immunity for ministers of foreign
affairs recorded in international conventions, domestic legislation,
and cases would contribute to codifying that rule as customary
international law.
Nonetheless, state practice does not appear to support the ICJ’s
majority decision. Conventions that solely provide for immunity
from foreign criminal jurisdiction for ministers of foreign affairs are
lacking. In addition, the ICJ ruled on the matter for the first time in
Arrest Warrant, and only a few domestic cases involve immunity
claims for heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs. With
respect to domestic cases, in Ali Reza v. Grimpel, 159 the French Court
of Appeals rejected Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State’s immunity
claim in a civil action when the Minister was a delegate at a U.N.
conference in Paris. The court indicated that it would have ruled
otherwise had the claimant been a minister of foreign affairs. 160 This
case is inconclusive because ministers of foreign affairs can claim
immunity during an official visit pursuant to the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”). United States courts also
granted immunity to at least one head of government and two
ministers of foreign affairs. 161 The U.S. Department of State also has
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. , 143, ¶¶ 11-12 (dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert).
1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
Id. at 44.
47 I.L.R. 275 (C.A. Paris 1961) (Fr.).
Id.
Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that
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proposed that head of immunity should be extended to other foreign
government officials, but U.S. courts have rejected these claims. 162 In
light of just a handful of international and domestic cases in which
the courts granted immunity to heads of government or ministers of
foreign affairs, the contention that a rule granting head of state
immunity to the group under customary international law exists is
unconvincing. Judge Al-Khasawneh observed this in his dissenting
opinion to Arrest Warrant. He asserted that there was a “total
absence of precedents with regard to the immunities of [f]oreign
[m]inisters from criminal process.” 163 Similarly, Judge van den
Wyngaert noted that the court only referenced one domestic case
before affirming the customary status of the rule. 164 The ratio
decidendi of one case does not amount to state practice.
Despite the absence of precedent in support of the customary
status of the rule granting head of state immunity to ministers of
foreign affairs, the ICJ still accorded immunity to Yerodia, the then
Democratic Republic of Congo’s (“DRC”) Minister of Foreign
Affairs. 165 The court resorted to the New York Convention, to which
neither the DRC nor Belgium was a contracting party, and concluded
that the convention accorded immunity to heads of government,
Libyan residents could not bring suit against President Reagan for damages
sustained from U.S. air strikes); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting suit against the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe); Kim v.
Kim Yong Shik, (Cir. Ct. 1st Cir. Ha. 1963), excerpted in 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 165,
186-87 (dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction over the Korean Foreign Minister).
See generally JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (2014) (stating that the little case law
available suggests that foreign ministers have immunity when overseas on official
business). The ICJ considered Kim v. Kim Yong Shik in Arrest Warrant. 2002 I.C.J.
at 145, ¶ 13, n. 14 (dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert).
162. Republic of Phil. by Cent. Bank of Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 79798 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (rejecting the U.S. government’s argument that the
Philippines’s solicitor general should be protected under head of state immunity);
see El-Hadad v. Embassy of the U.A.E., 69 F. Supp. 2d 69, 82, n. 10 (D.D.C.
1999) (refusing to rule on whether financial personnel of a foreign government
enjoyed sovereign immunity, but noting that head of state immunity does not
extend to all government officials).
163. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 96, ¶ 1 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Al Khasawneh).
164. Id. 145, ¶ 13, n. 14 (dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert) (citing
Kim v. Kim Yong Shik, (Cir. Ct. 1st Cir. Ha. 1963), excerpted in 58 AM. J. INT’L
L. 165, 186-87); FOAKES, supra note 161, at 121.
165. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. at 30, ¶ 71.
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ministers of foreign affairs, and other high-ranking officials when
these persons were sent abroad on diplomatic missions.166 The ICJ
went on to parallel the functions of a minister of foreign affairs with
that of a head of state, finding that both are “recognized under
international law as representative of the [s]tate solely by virtue of
his or her office.” 167 This analogy is controversial for two reasons.
First, international jurisprudence has not yet endorsed such an
amalgamation. Second, domestic courts that grant of immunity to
ministers of foreign affairs base their ruling on comity, rather than
framing it as an obligation.
1. The Lack of Equivalence between Heads of State and Ministers of
Foreign Affairs Under International Law
Article 15(1) of the Institut de Droit International Immunities from
Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in
International Law Resolution (“IDI Resolution”) extends head of
state immunity to heads of government. 168 Notably, ministers of
foreign affairs were deliberately excluded. In contrast, article 21 of
the 1969 Convention on Special Missions distinguishes between two
groups, with heads of state on the one hand, and heads of
government and ministers of foreign affairs on the other. 169 This
division is significant because the ILC’s draft convention initially
merged the two groups under the same provision, while the United
Nations General Assembly opted for the bipartite formulation. 170
Although article 21 grants the same special protection to both
groups, 171 it would be too dogmatic to align that special protection
with jurisdictional immunity. 172 In contrast, the ILC Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (“ILC Draft
166. Id. at 21, ¶ 52.
167. Id. at 22, ¶ 53.
168. Immunities from Jurisdiction Resolution, supra note 50, art. 15(1) (“The
[h]ead of [g]overnment of a foreign [s]tate enjoys the same inviolability, and
immunity from jurisdiction recognised, in this Resolution, to the [h]ead of the
[s]tate. This provision is without prejudice to any immunity from execution of a
[h]ead of [g]overnment.”)
169. Convention on Special Missions art. 21, Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231.
170. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fiftieth Session, supra note 80, at 275.
171. Milan Bartoš, Le statut des missions speciales de la diplomatie ad hoc, 108
RECUEIL DES COURS 431, 438 (1963).
172. Watts, supra note 49, at 38, n. 41.
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Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities”) distinguishes the groups in
accordance with their functions. Article 3 deals with the relationship
between the privileges and immunities available under the Draft
Articles and those existing under international law. Under article
3(1)(a), the drafters first recognized the privileges and immunities
enjoyed by a State in exercising functions related to “its diplomatic
missions, consular posts, special missions, missions to international
organizations, or delegations to organs of international organizations
or to international conferences.” This may allow room for States and
their officials to rely on state immunity and functional immunity.
Further, under article 3(2), the drafters contemplated that privileges
and immunities are accorded to heads of state rationae personae
under law. Moreover, the drafters only focused on heads of state and
held the view that only heads of state were entitled to privileges and
immunities for their status as the personal manifestations of their
States. Heads of states that are exclusively entitled to privileges and
immunities for their status mirror the international community view
at the time of drafting that heads of state and ministers of foreign
affairs were categorically different. 173 Thus, international
conventions have not yet widely recognized that heads of state and
ministers of foreign affairs are equivalent.
2. Immunity Granted on the Basis of Comity, Not as a Positive
Obligation
The rationale for granting head of state immunity is not solely to
allow heads of state to perform their functions effectively. Heads of
state also enjoy immunity because they are symbolically distinctive.
The principle is based on the antiquated respect for the “dignity of
kings and princes and the incarnation of the [S]tate in the person of
its ruler.” 174 Other officials do not share this unique feature because
neither heads of government nor ministers of foreign affairs are
connected to the concept of sovereignty. This connection is exclusive
to heads of state. Commentators argue that the head of government
and ministers of foreign affairs do not symbolize the “international
persona of the State” as heads of state do. 175 Accordingly, heads of
173. Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-Third Session, supra
note 8, at 21.
174. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 24, at 194.
175. JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 68, at 1033; see Watts, supra note 49, at

2015]

LET THE RESPONSIBLE BE RESPONSIBLE

523

government and ministers of foreign affairs are not entitled to special
treatment because international law does not accord the personal
“qualities of sovereignty or majesty” to them. 176 Oppenheim averred
that other members of the government do not “have the exceptional
position of [h]eads of [s]tates,” and, therefore, do not merit the same
treatment in the realm of foreign relations. 177
The ICJ reasoned that granting immunity to ministers of foreign
affairs that allows them to travel across borders to facilitate interstate
relations does not explain away this symbolical difference. Other
officials may also bear similar duties but are not eligible for head of
state immunity. In her dissenting opinion in Arrest Warrant, Judge
van den Wyngaert commented that States have recognized the
immunity for other reasons, such as “courtesy, political
considerations, practical concerns, and a lack extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction,” rather than a sense of legal obligation to do so under
customary international law. 178 Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on
the ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities attributed the
immunity granted to ministers of foreign affairs to international
comity rather than any established international law. 179 Watts agreed,
advancing that “international standards of courtesy and respect, not
adherence to any positive obligation” explain why individuals other
than heads of state enjoy immunity. 180 In Arrest Warrant, in only
referring to the New York Convention on Special Missions, the ICJ
hastily paralleled heads of government, ministers of foreign affairs,
and heads of state. Having established that heads of state and
102.
176. Id.; see 1 LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 358
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (referring to a head of state as an exceptional
position that is entitled to greater protections).
177. OPPENHEIM, supra note 176, at 358.
178. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 145, 148, 150, 177, ¶¶ 13, 18, 20, 70 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge van
den Wyngaert) (emphasis added).
179. Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and their Property, Int’l L. Comm’n, 103, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/415 (1988)
(by Motoo Ogiso), reprinted in [1988] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 103, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.1 (pt.1); see Report of the International Commission to
the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-First Session, 44 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 10, at 102-03, U.N. Doc. A/44/10 (1989), reprinted in [1989] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 102-03 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1 (pt.2).
180. Watts, supra note 49, at 102-03.
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ministers of foreign affairs are not the same under international law,
merely referencing the New York Convention is not conclusive. This
convention’s preamble stipulates that the convention only
supplements the existing (or non-existing) regime that governs
international principles of law, but not an instrument that confers
immunities.181 At the material time, there was not a single
international instrument allowing for privileges and immunities
rationae personae claimed by ministers of foreign affairs. Further,
whether they were entitled to do so under international law was still
unsettled. It was difficult to conceive how the ICJ reached the
conclusion that ministers of foreign affairs were entitled as such.
A customary rule formed without a legal basis lacks legitimacy. It
also defeats the raison d’être of the decision in S.S. Lotus 182 with
respect to forming customary rules. 183 The Permanent Court of
International Justice, the predecessor of the ICJ, refused to
acknowledge that mere abstentions of governmental actions could be
viewed as obligatory customs of international law. 184 In S.S. Lotus,
France submitted that Turkey’s criminal proceedings against foreign
officials that committed offences abroad breached customary
international law. The court found that state practice abstaining from
criminal prosecutions of foreign officials did not necessarily mean
that these States believed they had a legal obligation to do so. It
emphasized that, without the States “being conscious of having a
duty to abstain,” no customary international law prohibiting criminal
prosecutions of foreign officials existed. 185
The commentary above illustrates that no opinio juris for granting
heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs immunity
exists. The scarcity of domestic cases illustrating that immunities
have been consistently granted to heads of government and ministers
of foreign affairs further demonstrates that it is not obligatory to
grant immunity to them. 186 Moreover, as S.S. Lotus held, abstaining
181. Convention on Special Missions, supra note 169, prmbl.
182. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 22-23 (Sept. 7).
183. Id. (discussing how customary international law forms in determining
jurisdiction for crimes committed at sea).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 28.
186. Adam Day, Crimes Against Humanity as a Nexus of Individual and State
Responsibility: Why the ICJ Got Belgium v. Congo Wrong, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L
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from exercising jurisdiction over heads of government or ministers
of foreign affairs based on comity does not amount to a custom. In
her dissenting opinion in Arrest Warrant, Judge van den Wyngaert
specifically referred to S.S. Lotus and argued that “negative practice”
does not amount to customary international law without the requisite
opinio juris, which she found was not established. 187
3. Conclusion
The arguments summarized above illustrate that the ICJ drew a
weak analogy when equating ministers of foreign affairs with heads
of state. International law has not yet affirmed this approach. The
court also did not give significant weight to the symbolical difference
between heads of government and heads of state. Furthermore, the
ICJ unjustifiably “legitimized” state practice granting immunity to
heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs and defied the
general principles of international law. Unlike heads of state and
diplomatic agents, no international convention specifically confers
immunity on heads of government or ministers of foreign affairs in
criminal cases. Without both state practice and opinio juris
supporting this immunity, no such principle can exist under
international law. Many commentators agree that state practice
granting immunity to officials other than heads of state is based
solely on international comity rather than whether a legal obligation
to grant such immunity exists under international law.

B. THE EROSION OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
1. International and Domestic Jurisprudence on the Move
The notion of individual criminal responsibility in international
law for jus cogens crimes diminishes the absolute nature of the
doctrine of head of state immunity. 188 In her dissenting opinion in
Arrest Warrant, Judge Van den Wyngaert criticized the majority for
L. 489, 497 (2004) (noting that mere abstention by governments do not create legal
obligations under customary international law).
187. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 144-45 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert).
188. See FOAKES, supra note 161, at 81 (discussing the justification for
extensive immunity for heads of State); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002
I.C.J. at 153, ¶ 27 (dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert).
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adopting a “very narrow interpretation” of the provisions in the
various international instruments that deny immunity for serious
international crimes. 189 Individual criminal responsibility is reflected
in voluminous international documents. 190 For instance, the Treaty of
Versailles that concluded World War I (“WWI”) contained a
provision calling for the creation of a special tribunal to try the
former German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, for “a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 191
Notably, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties, established in 1919 to
investigate which State was responsible for WWI, recommended that
individuals responsible for “the greatest outrages against the law and
customs of war and the laws of humanity” should not escape
criminal prosecution because of their rank. 192 It emphasized that
allowing for such immunity and thereby acknowledging that such
crimes “could in no circumstances be punished” would “shock the
conscience of civilized mankind.” 193
The Nuremberg Tribunal, which was established at the end of
World War II to punish individuals most responsible for the
atrocities that occurred during that war, similarly held that “[t]he
authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official
positions in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings.” 194 Rejecting immunity for incumbent heads of state for
international crimes is also enshrined in the statutes of the

189. Id.
190. E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 25; ICTR Statute, supra note 92,
art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 92, art. 7; Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S 279.
191. Treaty of Versailles, art. 227, June 28, 1919, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT’L
L. SUPP. 151, 250 (1919); see M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End
All Wars” and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System,
30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 244, 266, 280-81 (2002) (noting that Kaiser Wilhelm
was never prosecuted because the Dutch royal family granted him asylum).
192. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference,
14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 116 (1920) [hereinafter WWI Commission Report]; see
Bassiouni, supra note 191, at 253.
193. WWI Commission Report, supra note 192.
194. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal, Proceedings: Two Hundred and Seventeenth Day, HMSO London Pt. 22,
411, 466 (1950).
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international criminal courts. 195 Commentators have also favored this
approach. For instance, Watts recognized the absolute nature of the
immunity afforded to heads of state, but contended that this
immunity should be qualified for certain international crimes. 196
Notably, these courts and commentators have limited the nonapplicability of head of state immunity to international courts. 197
Practice at the domestic level has been mixed. Although the House
of Lords in Pinochet allowed for an exception to the functional
immunity of a former head of state for torture, Lord BrowneWilkinson affirmed that the doctrine of personal immunity remained
unaffected. 198 Other domestic courts have ruled in a similar
fashion. 199 The French Court of Cassation in Gaddafi similarly
commented that immunity of incumbent heads of state must be
precluded “in the absence of specific international provisions to the
contrary binding on the parties concerned.” 200 The IDI Resolution
stipulated that in the context of criminal cases, serving heads of state
enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction regardless of the gravity of
the offences, but recognized that former heads of state may be
criminally prosecuted for international crimes. 201 The ILC similarly
specified that serving heads of state possess immunity rationae
personae. 202
Conversely, some countries have incorporated certain statutes of
the international criminal tribunals into their domestic legislation. 203
195. E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 27; ICTR Statute, supra note 92,
art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 92, art. 7.
196. Watts, supra note 49, at 82 (providing that a war crime should serve as an
exception to the general rule that all actions are protected by immunity).
197. See infra Section III.C.
198. See Regina v. Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
(No. 3), 119 I.L.R. 112, 153-54 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.) (emphasizing that former heads
of state lose their immunity ratione personae much like former diplomats).
199. See supra Section II E(2).
200. Gaddafi, 125 I.L.R. 490, 509 (Cass. 2001) (Fr.); see FOAKES, supra note
161, at 82.
201. Immunities from Jurisdiction Resolution, supra note 50, arts. 2, 13.
202. Int’l L. Comm’n, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction: Report of the Drafting Committee, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3174
(Aug. 2, 2013).
203. See, e.g., Law on the Application of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the Prosecution of Criminal Acts Against International Law of
War and Humanitarian Law of 2003, art. 6(3) (Croat.) (implementing the statute of
the International Criminal Court in Croatia); Implementation of the Rome Statute
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Such implementing legislation effectively lifts immunity for both
former and incumbent heads of state in domestic criminal
proceedings if international crimes are involved. To commence
criminal proceedings against Pinochet for jus cogens violations, a
Belgian judge explicitly stated that head of state immunity does not
cover crimes under international law. 204
These examples illustrate that apart from a few domestic
legislation, state practice consistently supports the absolute personal
immunity of heads of state from foreign criminal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, two ICJ cases after Arrest Warrant may suggest that
international courts have changed their position. Although the two
ICJ decisions did not relate to individual criminal prosecution, the
decisions challenge the traditional concept of the inviolability of
head of state immunity.
a) Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. France)
In Certain Criminal Proceedings in France, 205 the ICJ commented
on the inviolability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s head
of state. 206 France had exercised universal jurisdiction over Sassou
Nguesso, the President of the DRC and other Congolese officials for
crimes against humanity, torture, and enforced disappearance of
more than 350 individuals. A French Tribunal had already
investigated many of the Congolese officials named in the
complaint. 207
The Congolese government’s complaint to the ICJ argued that in
asserting universal jurisdiction over Nguesso and issuing a
réquisitoire to gather evidence from him under article 656 of the
French Code of Criminal Procedure, France transgressed the criminal

of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 § 4(1) (S. Afr.) (implementing
the Rome Statute in South Africa).
204. Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Bruxelles,
Nov. 6, 1998, Order of Juge d’Instruction Vandermeersch (Belg.), available at
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Belgium/pinochet_mandat_arret_0611-98.pdf.
205. 2003 I.C.J. 102, (Jun. 17).
206. Id. at 110, ¶ 35 (noting that French courts protected the immunity of
President Sassou Nguesso).
207. Id. at 104.
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immunity that foreign heads of state enjoy. 208 The DRC requested
that ICJ order provisional measures to cease all the investigations
against Nguesso, but the ICJ refused to exercise its statutory
discretion to grant such measures. 209 When determining whether
provisional measures are appropriate, the ICJ must balance the rights
of the applicant state and the rights of the respondent state because
the former has not yet established that it possesses those rights, while
the ICJ has not yet determined that the latter acted unlawfully. 210 The
court must also consider the need to prevent irreparable prejudice to
the rights in dispute. 211 In balancing these rights, the ICJ in Certain
Criminal Proceedings in France held that the proceedings in France
would not lead to any irreparable prejudice to the rights that the DRC
head of state allegedly enjoyed. 212
Nevertheless, the concurring Judges Koroma and Vereschetin
suggested that the court should have focused on “the risk of grave
consequences arising from the violation of such rights,” rather than
just the potential irreparable harm. 213 One commentator has observed
that the DRC and the concurring judges were concerned about
208. Id. at 107, ¶ 23.
209. ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art 41 (providing the ICJ discretion to grant
provisional measures to protect “rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial
proceedings”); see United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 6, ¶ 3 (May 24) (indicating provisional measures as part of the
United State’s complaint against Iran); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece
v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 6, ¶ 6, 45 ¶ 108 (Dec. 19) (acknowledging that it is
necessary to decide whether the court has jurisdiction over Greece’s request for
provisional measures and concluding that it lacked such jurisdiction).
210. Special Rapporteur, Third Report on State Responsibility, Int’l L.
Comm’n, 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.1 (Jun. 15, 2000) (by James Crawford);
Special Rapporteur, Third Report on State Responsibility, Int’l L. Comm’n, 141,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.1 (Jun. 15, 2000) (by James Crawford). H.W.A.
Thirlway, The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court of
Justice, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 95, 7
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1994) (arguing that preserving rights has its genesis in the
Arbitration Commission that the Bryan Treaties contemplated).
211. Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J. 135, 139, ¶ 21, 142, ¶
36 (June 22) (finding that France’s testing of nuclear weapons prejudices New
Zealand’s rights and consequently granting New Zealand’s request for provisional
measures).
212. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Fr.), 2003
I.C.J. 102, 109, ¶ 31 (Jun. 17) (opining that immunity was not violated when
proper procedures were followed).
213. Id. at 114, ¶ 6 (joint separate opinion of Judges Koroma & Vereshchetin).
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Nguesso’s loss of immunity because it would adversely affect his
ability to perform his official duties while on trial, undermine the
international reputation of the DRC, and jeopardize the stability of
the DRC’s internal institutions. 214
The dissenting Judge de Cara articulated that provisional measures
to preserve the traditional doctrine of head of state immunity are
necessary. 215 He highlighted the prominence of being an incumbent
head of state in Africa, emphasizing that the “[h]ead of [s]tate
embodies the nation itself” 216 and “symbolizes the existence of the
nation.” 217 Because of this “very special position,” the citizens of a
particular African state see an attack against their head of state as an
attack on the nation as a whole. 218 Encroaching on other States’
ability to conduct criminal investigations against Nguesso would
injure the present condition of the DRC, “given that the case
involve[d] the [h]ead of an African [s]tate [that was] on the morrow
of a series of vicious civil wars.” 219
Interestingly, the position of Judges Korma and Vereschetin is
consistent with the Arrest Warrant majority decision. The judges in
that case emphasized the significance of permitting heads of state or
ministers of foreign affairs to discharge their duty to maintain
interstate relations without hindrance or fear that other States will
prosecute them when travelling abroad. Judge de Cara’s reasoning,
on the other hand, is compatible with the archaic notion that heads of
state are “the personal manifestations of their States.” 220 Notably,
however, the majority in Certain Criminal Proceedings in France
did not adopt these concepts, and observed a trend that implied that
recognizing head of state immunity is diminishing. The majority
concluded that the DRC failed to prove that foreign criminal
proceedings against its President would cause instability within the
214. See Kaitlin R. O’Donnell, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France
(Republic of Congo v. France) and Head of State Immunity: How Impenetrable
Should the Immunity Veil Remain?, 26 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 375, 404 (2008).
215. Id. (opining that Judge de Cara’s fears of irreparable prejudice against
Nguesso implicitly extend to all incumbent heads of state).
216. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France, 2003 I.C.J. at 116 (dissenting
opinion of Judge de Cara).
217. Id. at 132.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 124.
220. Watts, supra note 49, at 36.
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State or would deteriorate its “international standing.” 221 As
mentioned above, when deciding to grant provisional measures, the
ICJ must weigh the interests of both parties. Here, the DRC asserted
the right to claim head of state immunity. This right contradicted
France’s right to assert universal jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes.
In refusing to order any provisional measures, the ICJ implied that
head of state immunity is no longer absolute and the ICJ may
override it.
If the majority accepted the modus operandi of Judges Koroma
and Vereschetin, courts could easily justify claims for head of state
immunity on the basis of preventing a covert coup d’état or
preserving the State’s international reputation, especially in war-torn
countries. 222 Moreover, such unmeritorious contentions would
frustrate domestic investigations of victims’ human rights
complaints. This suggests that relying on the traditional justifications
for head of state immunity is inconsistent with protecting against jus
cogens crimes. States must adduce genuine evidence to justify
invocating immunity for safeguarding national interest.
Certain Criminal Proceedings in France signifies a possible
departure from Arrest Warrant because the ICJ allowed domestic
criminal investigations against a foreign head of state to continue,
even though the investigations aimed to establish liability.
Nonetheless, decisions relating to provisional measures do not have
any bearing on the court’s judgment on the merits. 223 Given that the
case was discontinued in 2010, whether the ICJ would reach a
similar conclusion on the merits is unclear. Moreover, although this
case involved an indictment, France ultimately wanted Nguesso to
provide evidence to assist France’s investigations, although the
indictment could have eventually resulted in prosecution. In contrast,
Arrest Warrant wanted to prosecute DRC’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs in its domestic courts. An indictment, therefore, may not be

221. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France, 2003 I.C.J. at 108-09, ¶ 29.
222. Id. (joint separate opinion of Judges Koroma & Vereshchetin).
223. See Thirlway, supra note 210, at 11.
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as intrusive as an arrest warrant when the inviolability of a head of
state is concerned.
b) Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France)
Although the ICJ affirmed the Arrest Warrant decision in Certain
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 224 the court was
less focused on the dignity of a head of state. 225 Djibouti alleged that
France violated two bilateral treaties enacted between France and
Djibouti, the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the
1987 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 226 It
asserted that France violated the personal and functional immunity of
three Djibouti officials, the Public Prosecutor, the Head of National
Security, and President Ismaël Omar Guelleh, when it issued
individual witness summonses to all three. 227 None of these officials
were personally accused of committing the relevant crimes at the
time. 228
When assessing Public Prosecutor and Head of National Security’s
immunity, the ICJ distinguished between immunities rationae
personae and rationae materiae and consequently refined its
decision in Arrest Warrant. It affirmed its Arrest Warrant ruling that
incumbent officials entitled to claim immunity rationae personae
should enjoy “full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability” and should be protected from “any act of authority of
another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of
his or her duties.” It also held that the Public Prosecutor and Head of
National Security did not fall into this category. 229 The court
reasoned that persons who were not included in the VCDR or the
New York Convention as diplomats could not claim immunity. 230 At
224. 2008 I.C.J. 177 (Jun. 4).
225. Id. at 236-37, ¶ 170 (stating that whether an outside authority constrained
the authority of the head of state was the determining factor in determining
whether there was an attack on immunity).
226. Id. at 181, ¶ 1.
227. Id. at 194, ¶¶ 32-33, 241, ¶ 185, 240-44, ¶¶ 181-197.
228. See id. at 241, ¶ 184 (explaining that the witness summonses, témoin
assisté, are used when the French authorities are suspicious of the person receiving
the summons but lack the grounds to issue an arrest warrant).
229. Id. at 236, ¶ 170, 244, ¶ 194-37.
230. Id. at 244, ¶ 194; see Bat v. Investigating J. of the Fed. Ct. of Ger. [2011]
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first glance, it was encouraging that the ICJ was reluctant to extend
personal immunity to Djibouti’s Public Prosecutor and Head of
National Security. However, because the court strictly adhered to its
Arrest Warrant analysis, it failed to address the exact class of
beneficiaries entitled to claim immunity rationae personae in a more
detailed manner. In focusing on the VCDR and the New York
Convention, like Arrest Warrant, 231 the court’s analysis was
tantamount to acquiescing that heads of state, heads of government,
and ministers of foreign affairs to continue to enjoy personal
immunity because they are included in these two instruments.
In deciding whether France infringed on Djiboutian President’s
immunity, the ICJ observed that the key factor “lie[d] in the
subjection of the latter to a constraining act of authority.” 232 The
court found that no such a constraint existed and emphasized that the
summonses only served as an invitation to testify that the head of
state could accept or refuse. 233 It concluded that France did not
violate the President’s head of state immunity “since no obligation
was placed upon him.” 234
However, the ICJ did find that it should have apologized to the
President because France failed to “act in accordance with the
courtesies due to a foreign [h]ead of [s]tate.” 235 The court noted that
the invitation was sent as a facsimile, contained a short deadline, and
did not request consultation to appear at the French judge’s office. 236
Assessing the comity due to a foreign head of state raised the
question of the degree of respect that heads of state are entitled to
under international law beyond the immunity arena. Article 29 of the
VCDR, which applies mutatis mutandis to heads of state, provides
that the receiving State shall treat the head of state with due respect
and undertake all appropriate measures to safeguard his freedom or
EWHC (Admin) 2029, [2013] Q.B. 349, 368 (U.K.) (holding that non-ministerial
posts are not entitled to claim head of state immunity).
231. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 26 (Feb. 14) (stating that once a person ceases to hold their office, they are not
protected by immunity).
232. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 2008 I.C.J. at
237, ¶ 170.
233. Id. at 237, ¶ 171.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 237-238, ¶¶ 172-73.
236. Id. at 237, ¶ 172.
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dignity. 237 Despite this obligation, the ICJ did not consider that the
absence of a French apology violated international law. 238 Cryer and
Kalpouzos commented that the ICJ “was speaking in terms of comity
rather than legal obligations” because issuing the summonses neither
breached international law nor mandated an apology. 239
This case has two implications. First, whether a state action
against a foreign head of state violates the foreign head of state’s
immunity depends on the coercive nature of the action. Second, the
archaic justification for head of state immunity concerning the
dignity and comity owed to heads of state may be insignificant
because non-compliance with that obligation does not necessarily
trigger an international judicial response. The ICJ only urged that
France apologize to the Djiboutian President, but did not mandate it.
Failing to do so would have no legal consequences.
However, the immunity invoked in response to the issuing of
witness summons in this case is not the same as invoking criminal
jurisdiction over a head of state. These measures have varying
degrees of coerciveness. Serving witness summons to the officials
was minimally coercive since it was only an invitation. Nevertheless,
the case still holds persuasive value because the Public Prosecutor
and the Head of National Security were subjected to an arrest
warrant for subornation of perjury and convicted of in absentia after
the ICJ’s decision. 240 Like Certain Criminal Proceedings in France,
this illustrates that witness summonses are conducive to criminal
investigation and prosecution at a later stage. As a result, judicial
decisions in relation to immunity claims concerning witness
summonses serve as good precedent for future cases that will assess
lifting head of state immunity.
237. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 29, April 18, 1961,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502; J. Craig Barker, The Future of Former Head of State Immunity
After Ex Parte Pinochet, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 937, 939 (1999) (arguing that such
special recognition is based on respecting the sovereignty of nations).
238. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 2008 I.C.J. at
237-28, ¶ 173; Robert Cryer & Ioannis Kalpouzos, International Court of Justice
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France)
Judgment of 4 June 2008, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 193, 202 (2010).
239. Cryer & Kalpouzos, supra note 238.
240. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 2008 I.C.J. at
196, ¶ 36.
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2. The Modern Meaning of “Sovereignty” as the Duty to Safeguard
the Citizens’ Interests
In granting immunity to ministers of foreign affairs in Arrest
Warrant, the ICJ emphasized the need “to ensure the effective
performance of [the] functions [of the officials concerned] on behalf
of their” State and the proper functioning of the network of mutual
inter-state relations. 241 This reasoning, however, overlooked the
nature of inter-state relations and misunderstood the source of
authority conferring power on heads of state.
Several commentators recognize an understanding of sovereignty
that is different from that of the ICJ. For instance, Caplan put
forward a “collective benefit” theory that recognizes immunity only
for “state activity that collectively benefits the community of
nations.” 242 He explained that such acts contribute to the
“development of beneficial interstate relations.” 243 Caplan asserted
that conduct that “does significant harm to the vital interests of the
forum state” is a prime example of the type of state activity that
should not enjoy immunity. He consequently suggested that, in
determining whether to grant immunity, courts should consider
whether the conduct of a head of state harms these vital interests
rather than attempting to determine whether the act was public or
private. 244
Some States may have a vital interest to safeguard the dignity of a
sovereign. This reflects the traditional aim of head of state immunity.
However, under the modern definition of sovereignty, as elaborated
upon below, the dignity of a sovereign and the interests of the
citizens are intertwined and this definition no longer gives heads of
state carte blanche to invoke immunity simply for the reason of
upholding a sovereign’s dignity under all circumstances, regardless
of whether the acts are beneficial to its citizens.
Reisman asserted that the traditional concept of sovereign’s
sovereignty has become obsolete. He emphasized that international
scrutiny of a State’s human rights record without consent historically
241. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 22, ¶ 53 (Feb. 14).
242. Caplan, supra note 21, at 744.
243. Id. at 777.
244. Id.
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constituted a violation of that State’s sovereignty. However, he
claimed, “such pronouncements [have] become . . . the stuff of
refined comedy.” 245 Instead, Reisman opined that sovereignty should
be understood as belonging to the people, rather than a State’s
sovereign or territory. 246 Under this understanding of sovereignty, the
population’s needs take priority.
The theories of Caplan and Reisman together illustrate that head of
state immunity claims should not be permitted if the impugned acts
inflict harm to the head of state’s citizens. 247 A State’s citizens are
the de facto sovereign because their consent grants a ruler’s power.
Upholding immunity for the benefit of the de jure sovereign, namely
heads of state, at the expense of the de facto sovereign’s interests
should no longer be permitted. 248 Moreover, the international
community has undeniably accepted the principle that States bear
responsibility for protecting their citizens from mass atrocity
crimes. 249 These principles illustrate that the interests of the citizens
should have priority as far as safeguarding the dignity of a sovereign
is concerned.
The modern understanding of sovereignty prioritizes the interests
of the citizens, so logically it must also recognize that human rights
protection should supersede traditional notions of exclusive
sovereign authority over domestic affairs. Higgins observed
“tremendous erosion in the concept of sovereignty, relating
particularly to the areas of human rights and now possibly

245. Id. at 869-70.
246. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights Law in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 869, 871 (1990).
247. Cf. Hari M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from Severe Human
Rights Violations: New Direction for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV. 35, 52 (1998) (arguing that extreme human rights violations could be
a basis for an exception to sovereign immunity).
248. Cf. Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Politics, International Relations
Theory, and Human Rights, 31 POL. SCI. & POL. 516, 517 (1998) (arguing that
international human rights norms challenge understandings of the political system
as being composed of sovereign states that have authority over their respective
societies and can “command [society’s] obedience”).
249. See generally Dou Hubert, The Responsibility to Protect: Preventing and
Halting Crimes Against Humanity, in MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING
FUTURE OUTRAGES 89 (Robert Rotberg ed., 2010) (providing an overview of the
development of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine).
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humanitarian intervention.” 250 Indisputably, effectively performing
the functions of state officials indicates state sovereignty. However,
asserting criminal jurisdiction over these officials for perpetrating jus
cogens crimes does not undermine the sovereignty of that State. Acts
involving extreme human rights violations do not represent state
sovereignty and independence. 251 It is anomalous to contend that
international law ensures the effective performance of official state
functions, but refuses to deny any ineffective performance or
atrocious acts that state officials commit. It would be a “travesty of
law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice” if human rights
protections were subservient to the concept of state sovereignty. 252
In their joint separate opinion in Arrest Warrant in determining
whether an exception to immunity should exist, Judges Higgins,
Koojimans, and Buergenthal emphasized that the ICJ must balance
“the interest of the community of mankind to prevent and stop
impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes against its members” and
“the interest of the community of States to allow them to act freely
on the interstate level without unwarranted interference.” 253 The ICJ
majority erroneously struck this balance because it allowed the state
interest to override the community interest. If the court adopted the
pragmatic and modern understanding of sovereignty detailed above,
it would have placed greater weight on the interest of the community
of mankind.
Notably, exercising jurisdiction over the officials of a foreign state
for jus cogens crimes does not undermine interstate relations.
250. Richard Ponzio, Theme Panel IV: The End of Sovereignty? Roundtable, 88
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 71, 73-74 (1994) (transcribing Rosalyn Higgins’
remarks at a roundtable that assessed the status of sovereignty under international
law).
251. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F. 2d 699, 718
(9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a violation of jus cogens did not qualify as a
sovereign act under international law); Prefecture of Voiotia v. Germany, 129
I.L.R 513, 521 (A.P. 2000) (Greece) (ruling that torturous acts of German forces
were not of a jure imperii character since the forces breached peremptory norms of
international law).
252. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
253. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 85, ¶ 75 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans &
Buergenthal).
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Reimann opined that human rights protection is not the sole
prerogative of the State, but rather is “a concern of the community of
all nations.” 254 This observation confirms that the par in parem non
habet imperium principle must give way to the broader concept of
“the interest of the community of all nations.”
The modern definition of sovereignty does not only prioritize the
interests of States’ citizens, but also prevent states officials from
misusing the notion of safeguarding the dignity of a nation, which is
an abstract concept, to eschew criminal liability for atrocious crimes.
More importantly, it casts serious doubts on the bases on which head
of state immunity was established at the outset. If a doctrine is no
longer fit for the purpose it was created, this may suggest that the
doctrine should be reformulated or even abolished.
3. A Duty Not to Honor Head of State Immunity under the ILC Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
Chapter III of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
governs state responsibility for serious breaches of peremptory
norms of general international law. Article 41(2) specifies that, “no
State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious
breach” of a peremptory norm, “nor render aid or assistance in
maintaining that situation.” 255 An argument in favor of abolishing
head of state immunity is that any recognition of immunity for jus
cogens violations violates article 41(2). Under this rationale, a State
that grants heads of state immunity would either be condoning the
head of state’s illegal conduct, or be acting as an accomplice to the
head of state. 256 Bianchi congruously agreed that “to uphold the
254. Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity:
Some Thoughts on Princz v Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L.
403, 422 (1995).
255. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 41.
256. Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory
Norms of International Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 401 n. 198 (1989) (asserting
that if a court recognizes head of state immunity for jus cogens crimes, it would be
violating the principle of non-recognition and would become “an accomplice to the
act”); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism
and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and
the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 191, 226 (1983) (arguing that
permitting foreign perpetrators of serious crimes to enjoy immunity is “similarly
offensive” as allowing the State’s own nationals to escape justice).

2015]

LET THE RESPONSIBLE BE RESPONSIBLE

539

claim of immunity would have the undesirable effect of supporting
the unlawfulness of the foreign State’s acts.” 257 Bantekas explained
that the Court of First Instance of Leivadia in Voiotia similarly
acknowledged that “[t]he recognition of immunity by a national
court for an act that is contrary to jus cogens would be tantamount to
collaboration by that national court.” 258
Advancing this argument is problematic because of the abstract
nature of the “non-recognition” concept under article 41(2). The third
ILC Special Rapporteur, Willem Riphagen, characterized the term
“non-recognition” as a response to an internationally wrongful act
whereby the injured state refuses “to give an otherwise mandatory
follow-up to the event that has taken place.” 259 He explained that an
injured state could ignore any “mandatory follow-up[s],” namely the
rights or privileges granted to States that would normally arise under
the circumstances, because the State in question triggered these
consequences by violating international law. Riphagen saw the
“immunities of foreign [s]tates and their property” as an example of
such “mandatory follow-up[s].” 260 Riphagen’s successor, Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz, also advocated for this interpretation of nonrecognition that confirmed that even States could adopt nonrecognition as a response even when they were not the direct injured
parties of a State’s international law violation. 261
257. Andrea Bianchi, Overcoming the Hurdle of State Immunity in the Domestic
Enforcement of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 405, 437 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco
Francioni eds., 1997).
258. Ilias Bantekas, State Responsibility in Private Civil Action–Sovereign
Immunity–Immunity for Jus Cogens Violation–Belligerent Occupation–Peace
Treaties, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 765, 766 (1998).
259. Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of International Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330 (Apr. 1, 1980) (by
Willem Riphagen), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 107, 117, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (pt. 1); see Stefan Talmon, The Duty Not to
“Recognize as Lawful” a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other
Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation Without Real
Substance?, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER:
JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 99, 115 (Christian Tomuschat &
Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
260. Talmon, supra note 259, at 116.
261. Special Rapporteur, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, Int’l Law
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Riphagen’s formula, however, does not deviate from the current
head of state immunity regime, even when serious human rights
violations are involved. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
identify what amounts to “an otherwise mandatory follow-up to the
event that has taken place.” 262 The ICJ cases involving article 41(2)
were mainly concerned with territories occupied on the basis of a
breach of a peremptory norm, such as apartheid 263 and the illegal use
of force. 264 A common feature of these cases is that the factual
situation that arose out of the international breach, such as the
creation of a State or a legal claim to statehood, territorial
sovereignty, or governmental capacity. 265 Applying article 41(2) to a
legal claim arising from a breach of a peremptory norm is
unwarranted because the ILC Commentary only referred to factual
situations, rather than legal claims, under international law. 266
Consequently, whether a forum state should perform its obligation
under article 41(2) not to recognize head of state immunity for jus
cogens crimes is unprecedented. Unlike cases concerning occupied
territories where the legal claim for territorial sovereignty is
relatively uncontroversial, the legal claim inherent in serious human
rights violations is more obscure. Head of state immunity does not
Comm’n, ¶ 158, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/454/Add.2 (Jun. 8, 1993) (by Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz), reprinted in [1993] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 4-41, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.l (pt. 1).
262. See Talmon, supra note 259, at 116-18 (explaining that a broader
interpretation of non-recognition is necessary because “[t]here are . . . very few
factual situations created by . . . serious breaches that . . . automatically give rise to
legal consequences”).
263. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 55-56, ¶¶ 122-124 (Jun. 21) (advising States
to deny South Africa a variety of rights that are owed to it, including refraining
from entering into treaties, maintaining diplomatic relations, and entering into
economic relations with South Africa, in response to its occupation of Namibia).
264. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 196, ¶ 146 (Jul. 9)
(finding that Israel’s construction of a wall in Jerusalem to divide the Israeli and
Palestinian sides breached international law, and obligating states to not recognize
the legality of the wall, to refrain from assisting Israel in maintaining the wall, and
prosecute individuals who have violated the Geneva Conventions when
constructing and maintaining the wall).
265. See Talmon, supra note 259, at 125.
266. Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-Third Session, supra
note 8, at 113-16.
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emerge as a consequence of the breach. It is attributed to the
antiquated notion of state sovereignty, which already existed when
the perpetrator became the head of state. For this reason, recognizing
head of state immunity pursuant to human rights violations would
not give rise to a claim under article 41(2) unless the perpetrator
became the head of state as a result of the illegal acquisition of
territory through genocide or other jus cogens offences. Talmon also
supported this proposition and opined that not all factual situations
created by breaches of a jus cogens norm will per se “give rise to any
legal consequences which are capable of being denied by other
States.” 267
Nevertheless, denying legal effects can be construed broadly to
suggest that other States could deny any legal effect of “any property
or other rights” premised on the jus cogens acts. 268 Head of state
immunity is arguably one of these rights. This observation gives rise
to another interpretation that if a high-ranking official did not
commit jus cogens crimes, he would not need to invoke head of state
immunity. His existing right to immunity is then “premised on” the
fact that he committed the crimes. It would follow that States should
deny any claim for head of state immunity “premised on” a breach of
jus cogens norms in domestic criminal proceedings. This
interpretation is fairly far-fetched and lacks support from
jurisprudence.
It is difficult to determine which interpretation is best given that
the ILC and the ICJ provide limited explanations of non-recognition.
In the meantime, Riphagen’s formula should retain priority since the
customary status of the “non-recognition” concept is generally
confined to “territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of
force.” 269 However, this interpretation likely only covers situations of
illegal occupation. As such, this article welcomes further guidance
on an alternative expansive interpretation of non-recognition.
There is a possibility under article 41(2) that States are justified in
not giving effect to head of state immunity in cases of serious
breaches of jus cogens norms. The probability that this will happen
267. Talmon, supra note 259, at 120.
268. Id. at 118.
269. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 171.
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depends on further clarifications by international courts and jurists.
The concept of state responsibility has a relatively brief history and
its development is still in a state of flux. For the time being, the
analysis above shows that article 41(2) does not support States to lift
immunity enjoyed by heads of state merely for serious breaches of
human rights, unless the immunity to be relied upon was a direct
product of the breaches. The author suspects that article 41(2) may
support States lifting head of state immunity if the subject of the
charge relates to de novo illegal occupation of territories.

C. THE LACUNAE RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF HEAD OF STATE
IMMUNITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS
In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ held that head of state immunity is not
available when the suspect is tried before an international court, 270 as
was the case in Prosecutor v. Milošević, 271 Prosecutor v. Karadzić, 272
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 273 Prosecutor v. Taylor, 274 Prosecutor v.
Al-Bashir, 275 among others. Nevertheless, this observation is

270. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 25-26, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14).
271. Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions, ¶¶ 28, 34 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 2001) (affirming that the lifting of
head of state immunity for criminal prosecutions in international courts has
become part of customary international law and, as such, dismissing Milošević’s
argument that he cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court as former
president of Republic of Serbia).
272. Case No. IT-95-5-D, Decision on a Proposal for a Formal Request for
Deferral, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 16, 1995) (holding
that it has jurisdiction over the defendant because “the principle of individual
criminal responsibility of persons in positions of authority has been reaffirmed in a
number of decisions taken by national courts, and adopted in various national and
international instruments”).
273. Case No. IR-97-23-S, Judgment, ¶ 62 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 4
1998) (affirming the guilty plea of a high-ranking minister in Rwanda).
274. Case No. SCSL-2003-01-AR72(E), Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (“[T]he principle
seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a
[h]ead of [s]tate from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or
court.”).
275. Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for
a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 41 (Mar. 4, 2009)
(“[T]he Chamber considers that the current position of Omar Al Bashir as Head of
a state which is not a party to the Statute, has no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction
over the present case.”).
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misleading for two reasons. First, before the ICC was established,
only a few international penal tribunals prosecuted high-ranking
officials for heinous crimes. Only a limited number of countries have
benefited from these courts’ jurisdiction. 276 Second, because of its
treaty-based nature, the ICC is unable to provide for a
comprehensive mechanism to prosecute high-ranking officials.
1. The Limited Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Tribunals
In the past several decades, the international community has
established a series of international penal tribunals to prosecute
serious international crimes. Historically, domestic courts were
responsible for trying international crimes. However, over time, the
international community increasingly preferred that such crimes be
tried in the international fora because it assured better due process
compared to domestic courts of “victorious States.” 277
In asserting jurisdiction, international courts do not compromise
state sovereignty because States consent to submit their own
sovereign will in concordance with other States to “maintain the
supremacy of international law.” 278 In Taylor, the SCSL
acknowledged that international courts are not the organs of a State
and thus do not adjudicate States’ conduct. 279 Instead, these courts
“derive their mandate from the international community.” 280 The
276. See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 92, art. 1(1) (establishing jurisdiction
over crimes committed in Sierra Leone); ICTR Statute, supra note 92, art. 7
(establishing jurisdiction over crimes committed in Rwanda and its neighboring
states); ICTY Statute, supra note 92, art. 8 (establishing jurisdiction over crimes in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which includes Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia); Law on the
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
art. 1, Oct. 27, 2004 (Cambodia), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/
pdfs/KR Law as amended 27 Oct 2004 Eng.pdf (unofficial translation by the
Council of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Task Force, revised Aug. 26, 2007)
(addressing crimes committed in Cambodia).
277. U.N. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 75.
278. Id.
279. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-AR72(E), Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶ 51 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004).
280. Id. However, international courts sanction States to continue to act in
accordance with their international obligations. See generally G.A. Res. 3074
(XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3074(XXVIII) (Dec. 3, 1973) (declaring “principles
of international [cooperation among States] in the detection, arrest, extradition, and
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“complementarity” principle under the Rome Statute of the ICC
similarly holds that international courts supplement, but do not
supplant, the jurisdiction of domestic courts over international
crimes. 281
Notably, none of these tribunals recognize head of state immunity
as a bar to prosecution. 282 Lifting immunity in international tribunals
reflects customary international law and is closely connected with
the notion of individual criminal responsibility. This concept was
first enumerated in the Nuremberg Charter and has subsequently
appeared in other international documents, including the Draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (“Draft
Code”). 283 It has developed robustly in recent years to include not
only former, but also incumbent high-ranking officials. The ILC has
remarked that procedural concerns should not play a role in
prosecuting high-ranking officials who committed a crime against
the peace and security of mankind. 284 It further highlighted that the
removal of “any procedural immunity with respect to prosecution or
punishment in appropriate juridical proceedings is an essential

punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity”).
281. See Rome Statute, supra note 25, pmbl., art. 1 (establishing the ICC’s
jurisdiction is “complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”).
282. SCSL Statute, supra note 92, art. 6(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 92, art.
6(2); ICTY Statute, supra note 92, art. 7(2); Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra note 190, art. 7; Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-T,
Judgment, ¶ 541, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001);
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 140 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998);
Karadzić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, ¶ 24; see Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951
I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28) (discussing whether state reservations from the Genocide
Convention are binding); S.C Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/Res/25704 808 (Feb. 22,
1993) (“Persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the
[Geneva] Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches.”).
283. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6, Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S 279 (imposing individual criminal responsibility for crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); Report of the
International Law Commission: Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532/
corr.1 and corr.3, reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 15, 18-19, art. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add,1 (pt. 2).
284. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Summary Records of the 2408th Meeting, para. 36,
[1995] 1 Y.B. Int’l L Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2408.
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corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity or defense.” 285
It would be self-defeating to prevent an individual from relying on
his official position to eschew responsibility, but at the same time
allow him to invoke his official position to avoid prosecution on a
procedural basis. 286 The Draft Code’s Special Rapporteur concluded
that despite the difficulty of ascertaining the precise circumstances
under which high-ranking officials could be prosecuted, international
tribunals should eventually prosecute them. 287
Without the immunity shield before international penal tribunals,
the authors behind the massacres in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
and Sierra Leone have been prosecuted and convicted. 288 However,
these courts can only prosecute criminals on a territorial basis. 289
This is regrettable because perpetrators of human rights violations in
other States, such as North Korea and Somalia, are automatically
excluded from international criminal prosecution.
Scharf argues that the Security Council has been unwilling or
unable to set up more ad hoc tribunals for three reasons. First,
establishing an ad hoc tribunal is extraordinarily “time-consuming
and politically exhausting” because States must agree on the statute’s
content, the judges and prosecutor, and the budget. 290 Second, China,
285. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on
the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 137, art. 7(6).
286. Id. art. 7(6), n.69.
287. Special Rapporteur, Twelfth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, Int’l L. Comm’n, 108, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/460/Corr.1 (Apr. 15, 1994) (by Doudou Thiam), reprinted in [1994] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1.INT’L L. COMM’N, Report of International Law
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, at
paras. 133-34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/460, reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (pt. 1).
288. See SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, ELEVENTH AND FINAL REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 11-17, 19 (2013),
available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt11.pdf (summarizing outcome
of trials against high-ranking officials and rejection of head of state immunity in
the case against Charles Taylor); Key Figures of ICTR Cases, ICTR,
http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/file_attach/KeyFigures-ICTR-cases141028_EN.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2014); Key Figures of ICTY Cases, ICTY,
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFiguresoftheCases (last updated Oct.
28, 2014).
289. See SCSL Statute, supra note 92, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 92, art.
7; ICTY Statute, supra note 92, art. 8.
290. Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal
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who has veto power on the Security Council, has had reservations
about establishing more international criminal courts. 291 China likely
fears that its unpleasant human rights record would result in
prosecuting Chinese officials. 292 The fact that China is still reluctant
to sign and ratify the Rome Statute adds merit to this allegation. 293
Third, States without veto power might consider establishing extra
ad hoc tribunals as “inherently unfair” because the permanent
members would likely protect themselves and their allies from the
tribunals’ jurisdiction by using their veto power. 294
While the exact reason for not establishing more ad hoc tribunals
to try international crimes is difficult to decipher, the territorial
jurisdiction barrier imposed on the existing international tribunals
creates a gap in the international penal system. This prevents some
victims of human rights violations from obtaining redress, especially
if domestic courts are unable to try high-ranking officials for heinous
crimes because of immunity claims.
2. The Failure of the Rome Statute to Provide for a “Catchall
Mechanism” to Prosecute High-Ranking Officials
Article 27 of the Rome Statute lifts the immunity of high-ranking
officials. 295 However, unlike the ad hoc courts, the Rome Statute has
a more comprehensive territorial jurisdiction. 296 The ICC can assert
Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 167, 169 (1995).
291. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 344 (1995).
292. Steven W. Becker, The Objections of Larger Nations to the International
Criminal Court, 81 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 47, 58 (2010).
293. See generally id. (explaining why China and other countries do not accept
ICC jurisdiction).
294. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Sept. 6, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/22, GAOR, 50th
Sess., Supp. No. 22 (1995) (discussing concerns about the Security Council’s
political influence on the ad hoc international tribunals)
295. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 27(1) (“This Statute shall apply equally
to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular,
official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and
of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”).
296. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 25, arts. 11-13, with ICTR Statute,
supra note 92, art. 7, and ICTY Statute, supra note 92, art. 8.
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jurisdiction over nationals of state parties if the atrocities took place
in the territory of the contracting parties 297 or the accused is a
national of the contracting parties. 298 Non-contracting parties can, on
an ad hoc basis, also consent to ICC jurisdiction over crimes
enumerated in the Rome Statute that were committed within its
borders. 299 If states parties or the Prosecutor on his or her own
initiative refers cases to the ICC, they may do so under any of the
above jurisdictional bases. 300 Interestingly, the Security Council is
entitled to refer cases to the ICC pursuant to its authority under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (“Charter”). While the statute does
not explicitly concede this, any State, whether it is a party to the
statute or not, may be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC through
Security Council referral.
Although the ICC has broader jurisdiction than the ICTY or ICTR,
for instance, perpetuators can still eschew liability in three ways.
First, the Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that only binds
contracting parties. 301 The ICC’s treaty-based nature is distinct from
the ICTY and the ICTR, which were set up as subsidiary bodies of
the United Nations pursuant to article 41 of the Charter. 302 The
universal membership of the United Nations and the requirement
under article 25 of the Charter that all members comply with
Security Council decisions enable the ICTY and the ICTR to lift
immunity with respect to all States. 303 In contrast, the ICC is not a
subsidiary body of the United Nations. 304 States must give consent to
the court to lift immunity, either by becoming a contracting party or
acceding to the jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis. 305
Second, the question of whether a Security Council referral could
waive the immunity of a non-contracting state is controversial.
Commentators have vigorously criticized any coercive assertion of
297. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 12(2)(a).
298. Id. art. 12 (2)(b).
299. Id. art. 12(3).
300. Id. arts. 13(c), 15.
301. VCLT, supra note 94, art. 26.
302. See ICTR Statute, supra note 92; ICTY Statute, supra note 92.
303. Akande, supra note 139, at 417; see U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decision of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).
304. Rome Statute, supra note 25, pmbl.
305. Id. art. 12(3).
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ICC jurisdiction or denial of head of state immunity as illegitimate
and unlawful, absent consent from non-contracting states. 306 A
fundamental principle of international law is that “a treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third [s]tate without its
consent.” 307 Thus, article 13(b) cannot, sua sponte, lift immunities for
a national of a non-contracting state.
When interpreting a treaty, it is essential to include all applicable
provisions of the treaty and construe them in a harmonious
fashion. 308 The Rome Statute, except for article 13(b), heavily
emphasizes state consent. In his dissenting opinion in Krstić, Judge
Shahabuddeen articulated that consent in this context is significant
and asserted that “there is no substance in the suggested automaticity
of [the] disappearance of the immunity just because of the
establishment of international criminal courts,” even when States act
together, directly or indirectly, to establish the courts. 309 Given that
the ICC is merely a treaty-based institution that is not a subsidiary of
the Security Council, the latter’s referrals should be considered a
mere surrogate triggering mechanism.
Third, the ICC can only prosecute officials of contracting states
under article 27(2). Officials of non-contracting states are entitled to
rely on their immunity to escape arrest when contracting states act
pursuant to an ICC-issued arrest and surrender under article 98.
Article 27(2) states that the immunities attached to the official
capacity of an individual shall not bar the ICC from exercising
306. E.g., Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and
Non-Party States, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 13 (2001); David Scheffer, The
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 18
(1999) (arguing that the Rome Statute binds non-contracting states in ways that it
does not for contracting states); Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, 64 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 199-200 (2001).
307. VCLT, supra note 94, art. 34.
308. Id., art. 31 (requiring that treaties should be interpreted “in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context”
and explaining that “context” includes the text of the treaty, including its preamble
and annexes); see RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 161 (2008)
(noting that the duty to interpret treaties effectively under the VCLT requires that
the interpreter read a particular provision in harmony with the rest of the treaty’s
text).
309. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for
Subpoenas, ¶¶ 11-12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 1, 2003)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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jurisdiction over such a person. 310 Schabas contended that this
provision is a treaty clause and should only bind the nationals of the
contracting states. 311 In contrast, article 98(1) of the Rome Statute
prohibits requests for surrender or assistance that would require the
requested state to infringe state or diplomatic immunity of a national
of a third state. 312 Article 27 and 98 therefore create a conflict when
the ICC decided to prosecute the high-ranking officials of noncontracting states, such as the United States, pursuant to Security
Council referral. In Al-Bashir, the ICC upheld that customary
international law prevails when a conflict exists between two Rome
Statute provisions. 313 Therefore, the head of state immunity upheld in
article 98 is the governing rule because it reflects customary
international law. 314
Nevertheless, Article 98 is still reconcilable with the customary
law discussed in the previous section, such that immunity is lifted in
international tribunals. The customary law deals with the relationship
between international courts and States. It primarily refers to
instances where heads of states are being tried in international courts
(except for the ICC) on the assumption that the State to which the
head of state belongs has already waived the right to claim immunity
due to the special nature of United Nations as explained above.
Meanwhile, article 98 concerns interstate relationship whether a
State could arrest a head of state belonging to a State which has not
yet waived the right to claim immunity. In this regard, the traditional
concept of par in parem non habet imperium comes into play and
restricts States from infringing the integrity of another State by
310. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 27(2).
311. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 245 (4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter SCHABAS, INTRO TO THE ICC];
see Paola Gaeta, Does President Al-Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 315, 324 (2009).
312. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 98.
313. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, ¶ 43 (Mar. 4, 2009).
314. See Kai Ambos, La construcción de una Parte General del Derecho Penal
Internacional [Building a General Part of International Criminal Law], in TEMAS
ACTUALES DEL DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL CONTRIBUCIONES DE AMERICA
LATINA, ALEMANIA Y ESPANA [CURRENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, GERMANY, AND SPAIN] 16 (Kai Ambos
et al. eds., 2005); see also SCHABAS, INTRO TO THE ICC, supra note 311, at 391.
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arresting its figure head, such as its head of state, without the its
consent. States not signing the Rome Statute and acceding
jurisdiction to the ICC may demonstrate lack of consent.
The three loopholes detailed above illustrate that head of state
immunity before the ICC is neither automatic nor settled. Under the
Rome Statute’s current framework, state officials, especially those of
non-contracting states, can eschew liability. For instance, the United
States has strategically taken advantage of these loopholes and
refused to become a contracting party to the Rome Statute. Schabas
explained that, during drafting, the United States was dubious about
the non-contracting state referral mechanism under article 12(3) of
the Rome Statute. 315 The initial draft of the Rome Statute “required
consent of both the state of nationality and the state of territory,” one
of which must be a contracting party. 316 In contrast, the final statute
only requires the consent of the non-contracting state of whose
territory the atrocities took place. 317 The unintended loosening of the
consent requirement raised concerns for the United States given their
leading role in world peacekeeping. 318 Ambassador Scheffer was
wary that Saddam Hussein would possibly invoke this mechanism to
allow the ICC to scrutinize the actions of the American troops in
northern Iraq. 319 Moreover, the United States would be unable to use
its veto power in the Security Council to prevent Iraq from
voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Article 27 of the
Charter requires all five permanent members, together with four nonpermanent members, to vote in favor of Chapter VII resolutions,
which would include ICC referrals. 320 Schabas advanced that the
United States might not be able to obtain the requisite unanimity
among the permanent members to prevent ICC prosecutions of U.S.

315. William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal
Court: It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 718 (2004)
[hereinafter Schabas, United States Hostility].
316. Id.; see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 1994, UN Doc. A/49/10, Chapter II, art.
22(4).
317. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 12(2).
318. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 433, 458, 462 (1999).
319. Scheffer, supra note 306, at 18-20.
320. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 16.
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officials. 321
The United States is not the only country benefiting from the
lacuna inherent in the Rome Statute’s framework. As of January
2015, there were 122 state parties to the Rome Statute. 322
Consequently, approximately seventy States remain beyond the reach
of the ICC. Aside from the United States, these include two other
permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia. The
only way the high-ranking officials of these States would be
prosecuted for jus cogens crimes committed in their home countries
would be through Security Council referral. However, such a referral
is unlikely given that these States have veto power at the Security
Council. If the judges in Arrest Warrant acknowledged this lacuna,
they would have realized that the only way to ensure that all heads of
states are barred from escaping justice on the basis of their official
role is to lift head of state immunity in domestic courts.

IV: THE COMPLIANCE OF ARREST WARRANT’S
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE WITH
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW?
Legal certainty and justice are the fundamental pillars of law. 323
This section examines whether the Arrest Warrant decision satisfies
these two criteria and answers in the negative for both. Unjustifiably
extending immunity to ministers of foreign affairs in disregard of
emerging customary norms fails to achieve legal certainty.
Furthermore, Arrest Warrant’s understanding of the head of state
immunity doctrine denies victims’ right to justice because highranking officials can claim immunity to avoid prosecution. Allowing
high-ranking officials to claim immunity also defeats the right to
effective protection, which is an essential concept of criminal justice.

A. LEGAL CERTAINTY
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
321. Schabas, United States Hostility, supra note 315, at 716.
322. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20
parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2015).
323. Cf. Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: ‘An Extraordinary Legal
Philosopher’, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 489, 493 (2000).
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opined “a rule-based society” should be established to foster legal
certainty and predictability. 324 Such a society ultimately aims to
provide guidance and to prevent arbitrary application of state power
over those subject to the law. 325 In Korchuganova v. Russia, 326 the
ECtHR explained that legal certainty could be achieved when all
laws are “sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with
appropriate advice – to foresee the consequences which a given
action may entail to the extent that is reasonable under the
circumstances.” 327
The Arrest Warrant decision fails to achieve legal certainty
because the ICJ failed to “apply” customary international law when
assessing the applicability of head of state immunity to ministers of
foreign affairs. 328 Despite acknowledging that no custom governed
this matter, the court, nevertheless, created its own law when it drew
a flawed analogy between heads of state and ministers of foreign
affairs. 329 Judges cannot create law without an express provision
under the ICJ Statute to that effect. 330 Moreover, the court, in

324. ORG. ECON. CORP. & DEV., ISSUES BRIEF: EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE RULE OF LAW 2 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/
35785584.pdf.
325. Id.
326. App. No. 75039/01, para. 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 8, 2006), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22CAS
E%20OF%20KORCHUGANOVA%20v.%20RUSSIA%22],%22documentcollecti
onid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[
%22001-75706%22]}.
327. Id.
328. ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art. 38(1)(b) (“The Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,
shall apply: . . . (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law”).
329. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3, 21, ¶ 52 (Feb. 14) (“These conventions, provide useful guidance on certain
aspects of the question of immunities. They do not, however, contain any provision
specifically defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It is
consequently on the basis of customary international law that the Court must
decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers raised in the
present case”).
330. Cf. Edward McWhinney, The International Court of Justice and
International Law-Making: The Judicial Activism/Self-Restraint Antinomy, 5(1)
CHINESE. J. INT’L L. 3, 13 (2006) (documenting the ICJ’s role as an interpreter of
international law throughout its history and opining that the court will likely adopt
self-restraint in the future when engaging in policy rulings).
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adopting the phrase “such as” to imply that a non-exhaustive list of
persons can claim immunity, further muddled the concept of head of
state immunity. 331 The ICJ unquestionably undermined legal
certainty in these two circumstances.

B. JUSTICE
Criminal justice aims to maintain law and order, deter crime, and/
or penalize or rehabilitate lawbreakers. 332 Transitional justice further
centers on ensuring that there are adequate mechanisms for victims’
redress. This system focuses on developing mechanisms after a
“period of conflict, civil strife or repression” that address past human
rights and humanitarian law violations. 333 It values judicial responses
to human rights violations because they potentially help victims deal
with the past and foster reconciliation. 334 Accordingly, the
transitional justice paradigm places great significance on abrogating
head of state immunity.
The U.N. Updated Set of Principles of the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity
(“Updated Principles”) reiterates that it is important for all States to
secure respect for human rights through effective measures that
combat impunity. 335 These include national and international
331. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. at 20-21, ¶ 51.
332. See generally Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 226, 226-28
(1959) (exploring the value of rehabilitation as a principle of criminal justice);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing trends in theories of punishment and arguing
retribution “merits recognition as the criminal law’s central objective”); Julian V.
Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 PUB. OPINION, CRIME, &
CRIM. JUST. 99, 133, 143-44, 158 (1992) (discussing the role of various theories of
punishment and proportionality in criminal justice).
333. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS
JUSTICE 1, 2 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006).
334. Jessica Almqvist & Carlos Espósito, Introduction, in THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: VOICES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND SPAIN 1, 6
(Jessica Almqvist & Carlos Espósito eds., 2012).
335. Diane Orentlicher, Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights: Rep. of the
Indep. Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Revised Updated
Principles].
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measures to secure observance of the “right to the truth, the right to
justice and the right to reparation.” 336 Notably, principle 19, which
governs the victims’ right to justice, specifies that States should
“undertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial
investigations” of jus cogens violations and take measures to ensure
that the perpetrators are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished. 337 Any
measures that prevent the prosecution of perpetrators are antithetical
to victims’ right to justice. The ECtHR has addressed such denial of
justice claims.
Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) governs the
right to a fair trial. 338 The provision guarantees individuals the right
to equality of arms 339 and the right to have access to the courts. 340
Claimants commonly argue that applying immunity prevents victims
from exercising their rights under article 6(1).
McElhinney v. Ireland 341 concerned Irish nationals’ wrongful
assault claim against United Kingdom soldiers. In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Loucaides highlighted the fallacy of granting a
blanket immunity that would frustrate justice. 342 In his opinion, while
the ECHR permits limitations on the right to a fair trial, such
limitations should not undermine the substance of the right. 343 He
emphasized that a blanket immunity imposed irrespective of the
nature of the case is one such impermissible limitation.344 In his
dissent, Judge Rozakis also observed that state immunity is in a
336. Id.
337. Id. at 12.
338. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
ECHR].
339. Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1968).
340. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1975).
341. 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37.
342. Id. at 55 (dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides) (“In present democratic
society an absolute immunity from judicial proceedings appears to be an
anachronistic doctrine incompatible with the demands of justice and the rule of
law . . . The doctrine of [s]tate immunity has in modern times been subjected to an
increasing number of restrictions, the trend being to reduce its application in view
of developments in the field of human rights which strengthen the position of the
individual.”).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 55-56.
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transitional stage and asserted that its application is now only limited
to specific types of actions. 345
These remarks highlight that offenders should at least face the
possibility of being prosecuted. Principle 22 of the Updated
Principles, which requires States to adopt and enforce safeguards
against any abuse of amnesty rules, non bis in dem, and official
immunities, among others that foster or contribute to impunity. 346
International human rights law not only prohibits States from
committing human rights violations but also imposes positive
obligations on States to render effective human rights protections
within their territory. 347 States may guarantee effective protection if
their “civil and criminal law provide effective deterrence against the
violation of fundamental rights.” 348
Principle 35 of the Updated Principles highlights the importance
of guaranteeing the non-recurrence of jus cogens violations to
combat impunity. 349 As mentioned above, one purpose of criminal
law is to incriminate the perpetrators and make them accountable for
their behavior. Permitting incumbent high-ranking officials to claim
immunity impedes such accountability. As such, a criminal system
that recognizes such immunity fails to achieve effective deterrence.
Orentlicher argued that effective protection entails the obligation
to bring persons who committed human rights violations within its
border to justice. 350 She advanced that the authoritative
interpretations of several expansive human rights conventions,
including the ECHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the American Convention on
Human Rights, require States to “investigate serious violations of
physical integrity . . . and to bring to justice those who are

345. Id. at 49 (dissenting opinion of Judge Rozakis) (describing personal injury
actions that occurred in the territory of the forum state in circumstances where the
victim “had alternate means” to effectively enforce its rights under the ECHR).
346. Orentlicher, Revised Updated Principles, supra note 335, at 13.
347. THE DUTY TO PROTECT AND ENSURE HUMAN RIGHTS (Eckart Klein ed.,
1999).
348. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 24, at 410.
349. Orentlicher, Revised Updated Principles, supra note 335, at 17.
350. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2571 (1991).
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responsible.” 351 In her view, the only avenue to safeguard human
rights adequately and effectively is through prosecution and
punishment. 352
Several ECtHR cases that acknowledged the ECHR obligation to
“secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in [the] Convention” reflect Orentlicher’s arguments. 353 This
obligation implicitly mandates that States implement some form of
“effective official investigation” that identify and punish those liable
for human rights violations. 354 Without such measures, the ECtHR
emphasized, the prohibition of serious violations of human rights,
such as murder, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment, would become practically ineffective and would be
abused with virtual impunity. 355 For instance, X and Y v.
Netherlands 356 involved a Dutch law that did not permit the
prosecution of a person who allegedly raped a mentally disabled
girl. 357 The ECtHR ruled that States have a positive obligation to
adopt measures to “secure respect for private life even in the sphere
of the relations of individuals between themselves.” 358 The court
elaborated that breaches of “fundamental values and essential aspects
of private life” can only be effectively deterred through criminal
law. 359 Therefore, the court concluded that the absence of penal
provisions governing the rape of mentally disabled girls violated
article 8 of the ECHR. 360
In Kilic v. Turkey, 361 the ECtHR held that a lack of accountability
would give rise to an ineffective criminal law system for the

351. Id. at 2568.
352. Id.
353. ECHR, supra note 338, art 1.
354. All three of the following cases involved circumstances in which a State’s
agents used deadly force against individuals. Yasa v. Turkey, 1998-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 423, ¶ 98 (1998); Kaya v. Turkey (No. 65) 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R., 324, ¶ 86
(1998); McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at ¶ 161 (1995).
355. Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3242, ¶ 102 (1998).
356. 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1985).
357. Id. at 3-4 (explaining the victim was incapable of bringing the complaint
herself and was too old for her father to act as a substitute).
358. Id. at 7.
359. Id. at 8.
360. Id. at 9.
361. 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 75 (2000).
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purposes of the Convention. 362 If investigations did not lead to the
punishment or accountability of those responsible for serious crimes,
the system would fail to preserve the rights of the victims and
effectively protect them. 363
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has similarly construed article
7 of the ICCPR as obligating States to effectively conduct
investigations and to penalize those responsible for allegations of illtreatment. 364 In Muteba v. Zaire, 365 the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights ruled that States must investigate alleged acts of torture,
punish those found guilty of such conduct, and implement measures
to ensure that others do not repeat acts of torture in the future. 366
Prosecution is not the only means of guaranteeing effective
deterrence. Reparations also play an important role. 367 The victim’s
right to reparations has been a longstanding principle of international
human rights law and is enumerated in article 31(1) of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, article 3 of the Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, article 91 of
the Additional Protocol No. I to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts. 368 On several occasions, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights has ruled that the victims of serious

362. Id. at 99.
363. See id.
364. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 173; Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. Annex VI: General
Comment No. 20, 44th Sess., 1992, 193-94, U.N. Doc. A/47/40; GAOR, 47th
Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1994).
365. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. Annex XIII: Views of the Human
Rights Comm. concerning Communication No. 124/1982, 22d Sess., July 9-July
27, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/39/40; GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1994).
366. Id.
367. Diane Orentlicher, Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights: Rep. of the
Indep. Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, 28, n.76, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (Feb. 18, 2005).
368. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 art. 91,
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 43; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, available at
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/1d17
26425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6; ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 8, at 91.
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violations of human rights must be able to seek judicial remedies. 369
Principle 32 of the Updated Principles also reflects this concept. 370
The non-recognition of head of state immunity in domestic criminal
proceedings would facilitate the ability of victims of human rights
violations to seek such remedies in domestic courts.
The foregoing analysis suggests that head of state immunity from
domestic criminal jurisdiction renders criminal justice ineffective.
Van Alebeek observed that the domestic courts of the State engaging
in human rights abuses often fail to show sympathy for the
victims. 371 Moreover, countries are unlikely to subject their own
incumbent officials to criminal investigations and, even if they were
subject to criminal investigation, waiving immunity is unlikely an
option because the officials are part of the ruling power. Van
Alebeek observed that because prosecution in the courts of the
official’s home state is unrealistic and absent any access to
international enforcement mechanism, victims of human rights
abuses can only realistically resort to foreign domestic courts. 372
However, Bröhmer emphasized that international mechanisms for
redress are inadequate. 373 He opined that only national remedies
could give effect to the procedural side of international human rights
law. 374
These observations underline the significance of relying on foreign
states to prosecute high-ranking officials. However, if foreign states
are prohibited from initiating criminal proceedings against impugned
state officials and international courts are unable to claim jurisdiction
over those officials’ crimes, the victims must wait until the impugned
officials leave their post because head of state immunity is no longer
369. See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. Annex V: Views of the Human
Rights Comm. concerning Communication No. 778/1997, 76th Sess., Oct. 14-Nov.
1, 2002, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. A/58/40; GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2003); Rep.
of the Human Rights Comm. Annex: Views of the Human Rights Comm.
concerning Communication Nos. 241/1987 and 242/1987, 37th Sess., Oct. 23-Nov.
10, 1989, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/45/40; GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1990).
370. Orentlicher, Revised Updated Principles, supra note 335, at 17 (emphasis
added) (“All victims shall have access to a readily available, prompt and effective
remedy in the form of criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings”).
371. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 24, at 340.
372. Id.
373. JÜRGEN BRÖHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 206 (1997).
374. Id.
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available to former officials. 375 However, this waiting period is
unpredictable and any justice delayed is justice denied. 376 Relying on
the forum states to serve immediate justice in such circumstances
becomes merely theoretical.
Other obstacles hinder effective prosecution in the courts of the
perpetrator’s home state. Roht-Arriaza explained that States in
transition after a period of internal turmoil lack the substantive and
procedural infrastructure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of
egregious crimes. 377 She attributes this lack of a legal basis to
amnesties. 378
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, some jus cogens crimes are not
even codified into national penal codes. 379 Even if the State
introduces such crimes into this legal framework, the nullum crimen
singe lege principle prevents such laws from being applied
retroactively to violations that occurred before their date of
enactment. Such obstacles further illustrate that foreign domestic
courts are the only viable forums through which victims of human
rights abuses can seek redress. However, as long as those courts
continue to recognize head of state immunity, they will deny victims’
rights to justice and leave them uncompensated. Their human rights
would, therefore, lose their significance because, as Bröhmer
explained, a substantive right lacks that status if “the holder of the
right [does not have] the possibility to enforce that right.” 380

C. THE FAILURE OF ARREST WARRANT TO ENSURE LEGAL
CERTAINTY OR JUSTICE
The arguments above illustrate that Arrest Warrant does not
constitute good precedent for ensuring legal certainty and justice for
several reasons. The ICJ created a shortfall of legal certainty for two
375. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14) (noting States may try former ministers of foreign affairs
once their terms are over).
376. See generally FRANK MWELA, JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED
PRINCIPLE: TANZANIA PRIMARY COURTS: THE CASE STUDY OF IRINGA MUNICIPAL
(2013) (exploring alternative methods to overcome delays in criminal and civil
proceedings).
377. Almqvist & Espósito, supra note 334, at 9.
378. Id. at 9-10.
379. Id. at 10.
380. BRÖHMER, supra note 373, at 206.
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reasons. First, the case deviated from customary international law
and the court controversially created new law propri motu. Second,
the ICJ drew an awry analogy between heads of state and ministers
of foreign affairs. In upholding head of state immunity, the ICJ also
hindered criminal justice. Radbruch theorized that the legal status of
a positive law is jeopardized when equality is deliberately disavowed
in its enactment or the statute does not aim to address justice. 381
Judicial decisions or statutory provisions that uphold the head of
state immunity doctrine prevent victims from seeking judicial
remedies and thus fail to preserve justice. The fact that the ICJ
broadened the scope of officials eligible for immunity only
exacerbated the problem because more incumbent high-ranking
officials are able to eschew criminal responsibility for human rights
violations.

V. CONCLUSION
In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ wrongfully permitted the head of state
immunity doctrine to flourish and disregarded the serious human
rights implications that would result from the decision. If the court
had been more conscious of customary international law, ministers of
foreign affairs would not have benefited from head of state
immunity. Subsequent ICJ interpretations of the immunity suggested
that the notion of the inviolability of heads of state might not be as
robust as commentators contended in the past. The modern definition
of sovereignty also undermines the argument that human rights
concerns are within the purview of a State’s sovereign independence
or dignity. These observations illustrate that the granting of head of
state immunity for jus cogens crimes lacks justification.
States have already abused the unwillingness and/or inability of
the current international legal regime to lift head of state immunity
for jus cogens crimes. This reality emphasizes the need to abrogate
head of state immunity from foreign criminal prosecutions. 382 It is
381. Robert Alexy, A Defense of Radbruch’s Formula, in LLOYD’S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 426-28 (Michael Freeman ed., 8th ed. 2008).
382. Immunities from Jurisdiction Resolution, supra note 50, art. 13 (including
Rapporteur Verhoeven’s report on immunities, in which Verhoeven advocated for
an exception to immunity for jus cogens crimes and other particularly serious
offences before national courts); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of
Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 237 (1951)
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unlikely that high-ranking officials, particularly heads of state, will
be subjected to criminal prosecution in their home courts. For this
reason, more judicial platforms, including the courts of foreign
states, should be available to victims of human rights violations to
seek justice. Although critics cast doubt on the practicality of
prosecuting incumbent heads of state in foreign courts because it
may be difficult to establish a case “when evidence might be most
easily attainable” in the home countries of the heads of state, this is a
separate issue. 383
The argument that heads of state should be allowed to discharge
their official duties and facilitate interstate relations without
interference is understandable. However, that should not excuse them
from being prosecuted for committing serious human rights
violations. 384 In fact, heads of state would not need to invoke
immunity if they duly honored their international obligations to
refrain from committing jus cogens crimes.
Even more than a decade after Arrest Warrant, the need to further
limit the application of the head of state immunity doctrine still
remains. A specific international instrument that abolishes head of
state immunity for foreign criminal prosecutions is certainly
welcomed. 385 Alternatively, foreign states should be allowed to
prosecute the perpetrators in their courts, at least for jus cogens
crimes, to ensure that justice is upheld.
(hinting that the annulment head of state immunity for jus cogens crimes under an
international agreement or unilateral legislative action is imminent); Gaeta, Official
Capacity and Immunities, supra note 33, at 986-89 (advancing that the risk of
impunity trumps immunity rationae personae, especially when the evidence
indicates that the official’s own State will not prosecute or arrest the official).
383. O’Donnell, supra note 214, at 410.
384. Leen De Smet & Frederik Naert, Making or Breaking International Law?
An International Law Analysis of Belgium’s Act Concerning the Punishment of
Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 35 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
INT’L 471, 503 (2002) (proposing that courts should only recognize head of state
immunity for official visits that are “essential for the maintenance of international
relations”).
385. This may be particularly essential for countries that lack any connection
with the jus cogens offences committed in a particular instance. In that
circumstance, the only jurisdictional basis these countries could rely upon is
universal jurisdiction. However, whether universal jurisdiction trumps head of
state immunity is still uncertain. For further details, see Brian Man-ho Chok, The
Struggle Between the Doctrines of Universal Jurisdiction and Head of State
Immunity, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 233, 256-64 (2014).

